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CHAPTER I 
Local Government Reorganisation and 
Local-Authority Coordination in Christchurch. 
1 
The process of amalgamation of the suburban local 
bodies of the Christchurch metropolitan area with the City 
ended with the incorporation of Sumner into the City in 
1945. A brief account of the circumstances in which 
amalgamation took place up to 1945 offers an instructive 
commentary on the problem of local government reorganisation. 
The boroughs of Sydenham, St. Albans and Linwood amalgamated 
with the City in 1903 because the advantages of doing so 
were obvious and immediate. There were simply too many 
functions of common concern which could not successfully 
be dealt with except by an amalgamated local body. A 
high pressure water supply and a comprehensive method of 
sewage disposal were two such functions almost immediately 
undertaken by the new City Council. A poll of electors 
in each of the three relatively under-developed boroughs 
favoured m1algo..mation by a :margin of better than two to one. 
Between 1903 and 1945 twelve nore suburbs joined the City 
but the bulk of 'essential' reorganisation was corapleted 
with the accession of the suburbs of Bromiley and PapllllU1 
in 1923. 1 
The advantages of analgamation in 19e3 were tangible 
1 
J. P. Morrison: 'The Evolution of a Citl' Pp.120-126 
2 
and the irrationality of the continuation of such a large 
number of small territorial local bodies obvious. 
Riccarton Borough, sheltering behind the great expanse of 
Hagley Park and enclosed by the City and the County of 
Waimari, remained the only completely urban territorial 
local body outside the City after 1945. By this time 
the old compelling arguments for, and the conditions 
favouring, amalgamation,had disappeared. Riccarton 
certainly felt its identity more acutely as the neighbour 
of such a large territorial authority. Whatever the 
nauses, amalgamation as a method of resolving the weak-
nesses of a fragmented local body structure, was a spent 
force. After 1945 local bodies in the Christchurch area, 
though poorly coordinated for the service of the metropolitan 
area were not so poorly coordinated that further reorgan-
isation was imperative. 
If this dynamic was gone Central Government failed to 
provide a new motive force. Central Government respons-
ibility for local government has always been handicapped 
by the determination of the Local Government lobby (the 
Municipal and Counties 0 Associations) to resist wholesale 
reorganisation schenes. In the post-war period, however, 
a new and promising approach to the problen was recommended 
3 
by the 191~4 Select Committee of the House of Representatives 
appointed to investigate among other things 01 the general 
structure of the (local government) system 00 • 1 It found 
the most recent atternpt at reorganisation, the Local 
Government (Amalgamation Schemes) Bill 1937, unsatisfactory 
largely for the reason that it gave the Minister power to 
initiate amalgamation schemes and power to alter the 
findings of the Bill 0 s proposed Local Government Commission, 
The Select Co1:.tm.i ttee recommended that 09 the problem of 
local government should be taken right outside the con-
troversial sphere and as far as possible vested in an 
independent body 91 which would give 00 cont inui ty of procedure. 902 
This recommendation led to the passage of the Local 
Government Commission Act 1946. This Act established the 
independent judicial body recommended by the 1944 Select 
CoI!lmittee. But the Act did not set up a Commission with 
authority to formulate and impose amalgar::iation schemes as 
the Select Comnittee hnd intended. The Select Committee 
envisaged a Comnission conducting 01exhaustive 1nvest1gations 91 
and publishing findings which would be based not only on 
its personal investigations but also on the evidence put 
forward by interested parties.J Such imp::'.rtial invest-
1 
Appendix to the Journals of the House of Represent-
atives Volume II 1945 1 - 15. 
2 
Ibid p.157 
3 Ibid p.158 
4 
igations leading to an authoritative recomnendation, the 
Select Connittee considered, need not be subject to a poll 
of electors. 
The inclusion of a poll provision in the Local 
Government Commission Act 1946 very soon crippled the 
Cor::iniss1on°s authority. In 1949 the Cornr.J.ission's 
Christchurch Metropolitan ScheIJ.e failed, partly due to the 
defeat (by a bare IJ.ajority of less than one half the 6,ooo 
odd qualified electors in Riccarton) of the proposal for 
the amalganation of Riccarton Borough with Christchurch 
City. 1 This failure and subsequent denonstrations of the 
Cor~Qission's impotence did not satisfy the opponents of 
the Coonission. Cri ticisn by the local body .associations 
induced the Governnent to replace the 1946 Act with the 
Local Government Coa~ission Act 1953. This new Commission 
had no authority to initiate amalgamation or other schemes, 
but awaited either, requests for assistance from the local 
bodies o~ suggestions fron the Minister as a result of 
petitions made to him. The 1961 Local Government Coi=rmission 
Act did more than restore the 1946 balance by returning 
the Connission.0 s power to initiate enquiries and weighting 
poll provisions slightly more in favour of the CoIJ.IDission. 
1 Report of the Local Bills Corunittee of the House of 
Representatives 1960. p.187 
5 
In the period since 1946 when Eentral Government 
concern for local goverrunent reorganisation has amounted 
to little more than a willingness to tinker with the 
powers of the Local Government Comnission, new approaches 
to the problen of reorganisation in netropolitan areas 
haVe been nade. Most inportant is the two-tier system 
recol'.lnended by the Secrstnry for Internal Aff;:',irs to tho 19 59-
1960 Local Bills Committee. 1 This approach to reorganis-
ation abandons the aim of amalgamation of territorial 
local bodies. It seeks instead to remedy the effects of 
& eonseqwemc;; :f the division of a metropolitan area by 
numbers of territorial bodies - the proliferation of 
specialist bodies performing a single function for a whole 
area. 
Late in 1964 an informal committee of Christchurch 
local body members known as the Investigating Committee 
on Tv~o-tier Local Goverrn~ont, drew up on its own initiative, 
a bill to set up a Regional Authority for Christchurch. 
Much of its forn and wording was drawn directly from the 
Auckland Regional Authority Act. However, it was much 
nore restricted than its nodel for it conprised only four 
ad hoc authorities - the Regional Planning Authority, the 
Drainage and Transport Boards and the Metropolitan Milk 
i Ibid Pp.19 - 20 
6 
Bon.rd. The Bill was dropped when it was rejected by the 
Heathcote County Council, the Drainage Board and finally 
by the City Councilc Expectations that it would be 
supported by the City Council majority, the Citizens' 
1 
Association acting as a party, proved unfounded. 
This failure left seventeen major local bodies in the 
Christchurch area, nine of which are ad hoc authorities. 
The proliferation of ad hoc or special purpose local 
bodies has bt'E'en a major consequence of n relatively inflex-
ible system of territorial local bodieso Once the 
territorial authorities ceased to be contiguous with 
communities certain functions which could only be performed 
rationally and economically for the community as a whole 
became the responsibility of ad hoc authorities. A 
comparatively recent addition to the list of community 
functions performed by single purpose authorities was 
regional planning. Regional or oo-ordination planning for 
a complicated local body structure followed close on the 
establishment of town planning. 
Town planning in New Zealand was not given legislative 
direction until the passing of the Town Planning Act 1926, 
a piece of legislation which bears a close resemblance to 
the United Kingdom Housing, Town Planning Act 1919. 
1 Gerard Cheyne: 'Christchurch: The Men Who Rule' 
Ppo 148-150 .. 
7 
The Act imposed the obligation of preparing a tuwu ~lanning 
scheme on all boroughs having a population of not less 
than 1,000 in 1926.
1 It required these planning schemes 
to have been completed by 1930. 2 It established a Town 
Planning Board headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs 
to approve the schemes when submittedo Speaking on the 
Bill at its second reading, Mr. Bollard Minister of 
Internal Affairs, said that far from weakening the local 
bodies as some had suggested, the Bill was designed to 
enhance their powers.3 
In 1929, the Town Planning Amendment Bill became 
law and laid the foundation of planning legislation for 
n fragmented local body structure. Its major purpose 
was to extend the scope of the original Act to include 
more than one local authority in a regional plann:llng 
Scheme. The general purpose of this regional scheme was 
stated by the Act to be 91 the conservation and economic 
development of the region to which it relates and the 
co-ordination of all such public improvements, utilities, 
services, and amenities as are not limited by the 
boundaries of the district of any one local authority or do 
not relate exclusively to the development of any such 
1 Town Planning Act 1926, Section 130 
2 The time limit was subsequently extended to 1932 and 
then to 1937, 
3 N.Z.P.D. Vol.210, p.699 
8 
district. oql In the words of the 1944-45 Select 
Committee on Local Government, the Act "recognises that 
the principles of physical planning should apply to an 
area in which there is a community of economic and social 
interest, 912 
To achieve this purpose two or more adjoining local 
authorities were invited to unite, either on their own 
initiative or at the suggestion of the Town Planning 
Board,3 to constitute a Regional Planning Coonittee to be 
composed of representatives of the local bodies themselves. 
Delegates to the ComIJ.ittee ware to be appointed by the 
constituent local bodies and would hold office at the 
pleasure of their Councilso The Town Planning Board was 
charged with the duty of naming the principal local 
authority which would be responsible for meeting the 
r.iajor share of expenditure coonensurate with its voting 
power on the Coonittee. The Act supplied the territorial 
local bodies with an institution which they could 
collectively use for the purpose of providing regional 
planning guidance. It ~pecified that the regional 
U.lc:tS 
scheme~ not binding on constituent local authorities, 
serving only as a "model~. 
1 Town Planning Amendment Act 1929, Part II 
2 
Appendix to the Journals of the House of Represent-
atives Vol. II 1945 1 - 15, p,25 
3 Set up by the Act. 
The 1944-45 Select Committee of the House, in its 
survey of local government functions and organisation, 
noted a sharp rise in interest in town planning in the 
previous two years, an interest associated with the 
anticipation of post-war reconstruction. It sought to 
have regional planning more closely associated with the 
local bodies since it foresaw economic development of 
perhaps an unprecedented nature, making the need for 
regional as opposed to district planning,more urgent 
than ever before. To this end, it recommended the 
9 
transfer of the existing Regional Planning Committees, then 
under the Town Planning Branch of the Organisation for 
National Development, to local bodies as intended by the 
Act. They were in fact operating as rehabilitation 
advisory boards rather than Regional Planning Committees. 
The Select Committee considered regional planning in a 
broad sense and envisaged comprehensive blueprints for 
econooic and social development within the terms of which 
the existing local bodies could work. The Select 
Committee expressed its belief that the Town Planning 
Act 1926 and its 1929 Amendment set out sufficiently 
comprehensive objectives, and suitable planning institutions 
10 
to achieve these objectives but that legislation was 
required to compel the execution of the recommendations. 
The Town and Country Planning Act 1953 in its 
preamble is described as a consolid~ting and amending 
Act and significantly reverses the order of treatment of 
regional planning and district scheme planning. The 
Town Planning Act 192S was concerned with the preparation 
of district planning schemes by single territorial local 
bodies whilo regional planning was dealt with as an 
afterthought in the 1929 Amendment Act. In the 1953 
Act regional planning is dealt with first in recognition 
of its critical importance. 
The 1953 Act confirmed the feature which distinguished 
the Regional Planning Committee of the 1929 Act from other 
ad hoc authorities - the fact that its membership was 
drawn from and responsible to the territorial local 
authorities themselves. Part One of the Act ~Regional 
Planning Schemesvo, merely repeated the nain provisions of 
the 1929 Act with the difference that the regional 
planning schenes produced became binding on constituent 
local bodies. Much of the °'general purpose 00 of the 1929 
Act was repeated word for word in the new act including 
11 
the key instruction for the 10 coordination of all such 
public improvements, utilities, services and amenities 
as are not limited by the boundaries of the district of 
any one local authority, or do not relate exclusively to 
the development of any such district. 111 As before, any 
two or more adjacent Councils might unite to constitute 
a Regional Planning Authority, either on their own 
initiative or acting on the advice of the Minister. 
Constituent Councils are to jointly determine represent-
ation on the Planning Authorities. Failing their agree-
ment this will be decided for them by the Minister. 
Associate members able to contribute a wide range of 
relevant qualifications are provided for in both Acts, 
The important differencelj_as in the status of plans 
produced by the Regional Planning Committees and the 
Regional Planning Authorities. Whereas under the 1929 
Act the regional scheme. was to serve only as a "modeln 
for constituent Councils, under the new Act once a 
regional scheme or part of a scheme becomes operative it 
is binding on constituent local bodies. A regional 
scheme becomes operative when approved by all local bodies 
concerned but if any local body disapproves then the 
1 Town and Country Planning Act 1953. Section 3 (ii) 
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Regional Planning Authority may take the scheme to the 
Town and Country Appeal Board for decisiono As in the 
1929 Act a survey of regional resources is to precede the 
·preparation of the Regional Scheme. In both Acts a 
principal Council is to be appointed to be responsible 
for expenditure, though all uniting Councils will contribute. 
Part two of the Act deals with District Schemes, the 
subject of the Town Planning Act 1926. Opening the 
debate on the second reading of the Bill in 1953, Mr. 
Goosman, the Minister of Works, noted that out of 150 
local bodies required to produce district schemes under 
the 1926 Act, only seventeen had completed town plans and 
had them approved.' Under the new Act~ every local body 
is required to prepare a district scheme of its own 
district or have one prepared for it by the Ministry of 
Works, the full expense being charged to the Council. 
Regional Planning Authorities are to make recommendations 
to Councils on the compatibility of their district schemes~ 
with the regional scheme ahd may appeal, if necessary, 
against any provision of a district schene. 
Under Section 8 (b) of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1953, any planning body constituted for a metropolitan 
P. b8'q 
/ 
area before the passage of the Act, whether fornally 
constituted under the Town Planning Act 1926 or not , 
1] 
was considered to become a Regional Planning Authority under 
the new Act. Accordingly, on the 1st February 1954~ the 
Christchurch Metropolitan Town Planning Coonittee auto-
natically becane the Christchurch Regional Planning 
Authority., Up to this time the Metropolitan Town Planning 
Committee had no legal standing but was informally supported 
by Christchurch local bodiesc Its Chairman in 1954 was 
Mr. w. s. MacGibbon, a City Councillor. As there was 
some doubt as to whether the Metropolitan Town Planning 
Committee was such a body as referred to in Section 8 (b) 
of the Act, the six uniting Councils decided to take 
action under Section 7 ( 1) of the ii.ct and united for the 
purpose of preparing a regional scheme. This was 
formally approved by the Minister of Works and published 
1 in the New Zealand Gazette on 9th June 19550 
The process of conversion of the. Metropolitan Town 
Planning Committee into the Christchurch Regional Planning 
Authority began at a meeting of local body representatives 
on 5th April 1954. This meeting was convened by the 
Mayor of Christchurch to discuss local body responsibilities 
1 
Minutes of Christchurch Regional Planning huthority 
Volo 1~ 1954 - 57, po265 
14 
under the new Act~ The Metropolitan Town Planning 
Committee, {which retained its identity) in a letter to 
the meeting recomnended that the City Council should have 
four representatives on the Regional Planning Authority, 
that one of these should be Chairman and that the other 
five or six local bodies should have one representative 
each. At a neeting on 23rd August 1954, the Metropolitan 
Town Planning Connittee reconstituted itself as the 
Christchurch Regional Planning Authority. City Council 
representation of four, one of whom was to be Chairman, 
was confirmed. Riccarton Borough and the Counties of 
Halswell, Heathcote, Paparua and Waimari were each to have 
1 one representatives The City Council was formally named 
the principal Council as required by the Act. 
There were some who believed that such a Regional 
Planning Authority night in tine far surpass the planning 
function allotted it by the 1953 Ac~ and assume a key 
role in local government re.forno In the debate on the 
second reading of the Town and Country Planning Bill~ 
Mr. Halstead M.P~ for Tanaki, .argued that one reason for 
the failure of local body reforo up to that tioe was that 
regional developoent plans did not exist as a basis for 
1 
Wainari has since been awarded two representatives. 
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reorganisation. According to Mro Halstead "the Bill 
will enable a Regional Authority in Auckland not only to 
lay down a physical plan for Auckland but alsA to make 
suggest ions for the future of its administrative control •• ~91 
He argued that once there was ~ regional development 
plan a regional or mAtropolitan commission of works would 
be required to carry out its proposalso . Mr~ Halstead 
envisaged that this Commission of Works would gradually 
extend its responsibilities to include those of the ad 
hoc authoritieso A similar approach to local body 
reform was suggested by the Commissioner of Works in his 
submission to the Local Bills Committee in 1960. He 
foresaw regional all-purpose Councils evolving from 
Regional Planning Authorities. 2 
In Christchurch there is no likelihood of this 
happening but the Regional Planning Authority has 
nevertheless assumed unexpected. functions in a way not 
anticipated by the 1953 Aot. In the course of performing 
its long term and overall :.planning function it has 
isolated two potential ad hoc authority functions and 
assumed them for itself o The Authority 9 s Summit Road 
and Air Pollution' Committees are primarily functional, 
1 
N.Z.P.D. Vol.299, p.800 
2 
Report of the Local Bills Committee of the House of 
Representatives, p.2J 
not planning Committees. Though comparatively 1nsignifi-
cant examples these two committees illustrate the way in 
which the Authority may extend its operations. 
The Regional Planning Authority in Christchurch is 
·important not because it may create or assume further 
functional responsibilities as a result of its planning 
activities. It is important because it enforces an 
essential measure of c~rdination among local bodies in 
the areao 1 The Regional Planning Authority is in a 
sense the ultimate ad hoc authorityo It has assumed 
the long-term planning responsibility of each local body 
in the region .. Each local body has its plan or view of its 
long term purpose but in terms of the region as a whole 
this ambition is partial, perhaps distorting. It is 
the Authority 9 s function to discipline these ambitions, 
balancing them all in the regional schemeo 
This perhaps accords with Mro Halsteadvs hopes. 
Unfortunately, however, since its establishment the 
Authority has suffered from what appears to be a contra-
diction between its constitut~on and its purpose. On 
the one hand, because it was set up by~ and virtually as 
1 
I~ is worth noting that the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1953 became law at the very time when the Local 
Government Commission, as reconstituted under the 
Local Government Commission Act 1953, was seriously 
weakened as a device to achieve local government 
reorganisation. Though there was certainly no such 
connection intended by the Government, the importance 
of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 was enhanced 
by the passage of legislation diminishing the 
authority of the Local Government Commission. 
a committee of# local bodies#it has been assumed that in 
some way it is directly responsible to the local bodies. 
This has amounted to an assumption by some that the pre-
ponderant local body,. the City Council 1 must have the 
principal voice in its direction. On the other hand th'e 
Authority 0 s purpose is manifestly a regional purpose which 
is quite distinct from the purpose of even its largest 
constituent. 
City Council misinterpretation of its relation with 
the Regional Planning Authority has been the principal 
factor in the history of the Authority 0s attempt to 
establish a defined and 3ccepted place in the local body 
structure. The first indication of the City Council 0 s 
intentionf was revealed by a dispute about the Chairmanship 
of the Authority. On JOth August 1954 the Authority 
elected its first Chairman, City Councillor W'I S. MacGibbon. 
At the next meeting of the Authority on 27th September, 
Councillor Tait_ speaking for the City Council, said that 
he believed the agreement to have been not merely that a 
City representative be Chairman but that.any nominee must 
first have City Council approval. The Labour dominated 
City Council did not approve of the Authority 0 s choice -
Mr. MacGibbon was a Citizens 0 Association Councillor. 
18 
His replacement as one of the City 9 s four representatives 
was intended to demonstrate the Council 0 s intention of 
asserting a specifically City Council interest in the 
Authority. 
Though the City Council was successful in installing 
a Chairman of whom it approved this was a hollow victory. 
In time it became clear that the Authority would assume a 
largely independent regional direction no matter who its 
Chairman was. This is a characteristic of its planning 
function which is a professional exercise having a 
disc~pline and momentum of its own. Town planning skills 
are exercised for a clear regional purpose under the 
terms of the 1953 Act. It is not the City Council 0 s 
function to dominate and use the Regional Planning 
Authority but to be disciplined itself by the Authority • 
Today the City Council appears to half understand the 
necessity for this C(){)rdinating function~ From the 
point of view of its own concerns it appreciates the 
Authority 0 s value as a mediator or screen with the 
surrounding local bodies. On the wider issue of ceerd-
ination it recognises that the necessity for a regional 
planning scheme cannot be denied. But because planning 
19 
1s not fully understood as a continuous process of 
revision and adjustment it finds the Authority's continuous 
concern for aspects of the regional scheme particularly 
irksome. Instead of setting out a precise regi~nal 
plan and then stepping aside to let the local bodies get 
on with the business of implementing it, the Authority 
is constantly querying proposals which the local bodies 
regard as within their own sphere. Of ail the local 
bodies the City Council is least amenable to being 
0 cCM>rdinated 0 in such detail. Very conscious of its 
overwhelming size and employing specialist technical 
officers of its own1 the City Council does not easily sub-
mit to the Authority's uuwatching brief'°. 2 
It is not surprising that a City Councillor unfamiliar 
with the work of the Authority might feel resentment at 
the ability of the Authority to exercise such a supervising 
power over his Council. Councillor P. J. Skellerup f~r 
instance. has complained of Authority uudictation 91 in the 
past.3 Nevertheles~ he told the author in December 1966 
that his own attitude to the Authority, along with that of 
other Citizens• Councillors had become much less critical. 
1 The City Council employs a town planner and a traffic 
engineer. 
2 Mr. c. B. Millar 
3 °Star' 6th June 1964. In connection with the 
Authority 0 s advocacy of the Master Transportation 
Plan. 
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Some Councillors are more positive. Mr. A. R9 Guthrey 
an experienced and influential Citizensv Councillor who 
became Deputy-Chairman of the Authority in 1966, under-
stands and welcomes the Authority 0 s regional cc;erdinating 
function. He takes the view that in any case of conflict 
between what he judges to be regional interests and his 
own Council's interests, he must invariably take a regiunal 
view. Though nominated by the City Council he does n~t 
consider himself obliged merely to carry his Council's 
viewpoint to the Authority for he believes that such 
practice is incompatible with the regional purpose for 
which the Authority is established5 1 
On the Labour side, Councillor N. G. Pickering, leader 
of the Labour group, has interpreted the recent advent of 
Councillor Guthr·ey as Deputy-Chairman of the Regional 
Planning Authority, as a fresh attempt to achieve the 
regional purposes which failed with the defeat of the ~wo-
tier local government proposals in 1964-1965. There is 
certainly a much greater rHluctance on the part of Labour 
Councillors to accept the implications fur the City Council 
of the Authority's independent regional function. 
Councillor Pickering believes that Councillor Guthreyes 
1 Councillor Guthrey was one of the promoters of the 
Christchurch Regional Authority Bill. 
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prop3r course is to carry Council instructions to the 
Authority. Councillor H. E. Denton, currently Labour's 
representative on the Authority believes that he must 
adopt a primarily City Council v~ew and is adam3.nt that the 
Authority should be restricted to an advisory role, As 
the Council minority, Labour supply only one of the four 
Council representatives to the Authority a.nd feel p0wer-
less to check what they believe to be an undesirable 
development in local Lody affairso 
The at~itude of the smaller territorial authorities 
to the Regional Planning Authority was at first heavily 
influenced by the overt ambition of the City Council to 
dominate the Authority. Ccmmenting on the question of 
the disputed Chairmanship in 1954, Mr. E. J. Bradshaw, 
Riccarton Borough representative on the Authority, 
implicitly rejected the assumption that the Auth()rity was 
merely the servant of the local bodies. Mr. Bradshaw 
contended that the Authority was an autnnomous body set 
up under an Act of Parliam3nt and that the City Council 9 s 
denial of the Authority's right to freely elect a Chairman 
was an improper interference in the affairs of another 
1 local body11 This bold anticipation of the.Authority's 
1 Minutes of the Regional Planning Authority 
Vol. I, 1954-57, p.11 
independence looked beyond the circumstances of the 
Authority's constitution to the performance of its 
function. 
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Yet it took time for the Authority to establish its 
independent function and in the first years fears of 
City Council domination were widespread, When the City 
Council agreed to the transfer of its Town Planning 
Officer, Miss Nancy Northcraft, to head the Authority 
while remaining on the City 9 s payroll these fears seemed 
to be confirmed. Some feared rather more than City 
Council domination. It was believed that the Authority 
was a device to secure the substance of amalgamation and 
that City Council domination of the Authority was the 
first step in this process. As the Authority gradually 
established the autonomous role which Mr. Bradshaw 
predicted for it in 1954, the opponents of amalgamation 
have, paradoxically, been able to argue that the 
cGerdinating function of the Authority has eliminated 
the nece~sity for local body reform. 
By assuming the Chairmanship of the Authority in 
February 1960, Mr. Bradhsaw gave formal notice of the 
Authority's achievement of independent status. The 
23 
Chairmanship, symbol 9f City Council dominance, was not 
readily conceded. In 1957, Mr. Bradshaw was nominated 
and seconded for the Chairmanship but declined on the 
grcunds that he could not accept it unless he was first 
approved by the City Council. By 1960 it was clear that 
the Chairmsmship was of little use to the Ci t:y Council. 
As the representative of a small local body which poses 
no threat to others Mr. Bradshaw has been free to adopt a 
thorough-going regional point of view. 
Curren'.:; attitudes towards the f.1uthority among the 
smaller local bodies are based, on the whole, on an 
adequate understanding of, and approval for, the Authorityvs 
function. Because Councillors in the smaller territorial 
bodies generally have more time and are not confined by 
party political attitudes, they are more likely to take 
a sympathetic view of the Authority. More important, 
they are conscious of being represensatives of small local 
bodies which are only parts of a larger whole, Consequently 
they more readily apprec~ate the Authority 9 s cG-erdinating 
role. There is, however, at least one exception. 
Paparua County Council insists that its rep~esentative 
operate as a messenger who merely carries instructions 
from his vouncil to the Authoritye Despite this close 
24 
supervision the County Council has discussed the 
possibility of withdrawing from the Authority on the 
grounds that they have often found themselves committed to 
a ~ertain course of action in advance of their discussion 
1 
of it. 
Since 1960 when he became Chairman o~ thA Authority, 
Mr. Bradshaw has sought to persuade Councils' represent-
atives to adopt a regional viewpoint in their role as 
Authority members. While this appeal has been partially 
successful, the persistence of Paparua 0 s attitude and the 
more intractable problem of the City Council has forced 
him to seek other remedies to the problem of fully 
ensuring the Authority's independence. I.ate in 1966 he 
suggested that if the Authority were publicly elected it 
would be a much stronger and more independent body, 
Mr. Bradshaw envisaged that the Authority should continue 
to have the same number and proportion of vot'ing members 
but that instead af being appointed by ~heir Councils 
they should be elected within their territorial local 
1 body areas. This appears to be a pr~posal for a very 
limited form of Regional Authority which is to be 
restricted to one ad hoc authority function - regional 
1 'PrSlli.~' 15th November 1966. 
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planning. The immediate problem would be one of finance. 
If the Authority were to be made directly responsible to 
the·public some alternative method of financing would have 
to be found for the local bodies could hardly be expected 
to contribute to the expenses of a planning organisation 
in which they :tad no vote. 
Yet this solution to the difficulties of the Authority 
could only exacerbate them. If implemented the proposal 
would have the effect of drawing a hard and fast line 
between those who plan for the region and those who 
implement these plans, with the result that the difficulties 
and resentments which exist today would become intolerable. 
The system as it operates gives the constituen~s of the 
Authority a voice in their own co-ordination. The 
Authority is a forum where local bodies send representatives 
to supervise the production of a regional planning schene. 
Though unusually dependent upon technical advice they nust 
still take rJSl.jor policy decisions on pr:.orities and 
alternatives. The RegionSt.l Planning Authority at once 
controls and is controlled. The appa1e1~t contradiction 
between constitution and function - between local body 
political co:ntrol and the independent direction of the 
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planning function - is no contradiction but thE compromise 
on which the Authority operates. If the Authority had 
the means to assert its full independence it would fail. 
With the mandatory help of the regional ~lanning scheme 
the local bodies c~rdinate themselves. 
CHAPTER II 
The Developnent of the 
Master Transportation Plan 
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Schedule One of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1953 lists "matters to be dealt with in regional planning 
schemesu1 but these matters may be undertaken ouas may be 
1 appropriate to the circumstanceswa. At the 5th April 
1954 C~nference of local bodies convened by the Mayor of 
Christchurch to discuss the responsibilities of local 
bodies under the Act 7 this question of priorities was 
touched upon by Mr. Somers, the City Engineer. His 
suggestion was that the first projects of the new Regional 
Planning Authority might be urban-rural zoning and 
main road planning. 2 In fact though, the first major 
project undertaken by the Authority was a survey of 
existing land use as the basis for the determination of 
an urban-rural division. On 1st September 1959 Section 
One (Rural Zone) of the regional scheme became operative. 
Commenting on the significance of this Miss Northcraft 
said that with sprawl contnined nchristchurch has a little 
breathing space in which to try to find solutions to the 
more complex problems of its urban developments and 
requirements. or3 
---.-----
1 Town and Country Planning Act 1953 Section 6 (1) 
2 
Regional Planning .Authority Minutes '1954-57, p.1 
3 
Regional Planning Authority Minutes 1958-60, p.695 
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Though the urban-rural division had first priority, 
a number of other major projects were either begun or 
under consideration by 1955. These included the study 
of present and future industrial zones, a study of the 
commercial and shopping areas and the distrrbution of the 
maj0r recreati0nal areas. It was assumed that once the 
study of these major elements of the City 0.s future devel-
opment were sufficiently advanced a transportaticn study 
to link all the elements together would be ~egun. 
However, developments outside the Authority's domain 
forced an early, possibly premature, consideration of the 
issue of traffic and transportation planning. In 
February 1955 7 the Christchurch District Office of the 
Ministry of Works drew the attention of the National 
Rends Board to the problem of congestion on the Main 
North Road out of the City, especially in the section 
between Chaney 0 s Corner and the ::Caiapoi Beach turn-off. 
This initiative was taken in response to complaints in 
the Christchurch papers and by organisations su.ch as the 
1 Chamber of Commerce and the Canterbury Progress League. 
On 20th April 1956, the 0 Press 0 reported the recommendation 
of the engineer to the National Roads Board (Mr. L.C. Malt) 
1 
Interview Mr. G. c. Suggate Ministry of Works. 
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that Christchurch ought to begin preparation °1of a master 
plan for a system of wide highways leading into and through 
the City.vo This recommendation was made on the occasion 
of the National Roads Board 0 s approval of the Auckland 
Master Transportation Plan, completed late in 1955. 
In response to this suggestion a combined meeting 
of the Christchurch Regional Planning Authorityis Executive 
and Technical Committees on 24th April recommended the 
establishment of a sub-committee to outline an approach 
to the problem of preparing a transportation plan for 
the City. Though she sponsored the recommendation 
Miss Northcroft warned that other sectors of the regionel 
scheme ought to be further advanced before effort was 
1 00 concentrated on this one aspect of the Plan°0 • 
On Jrd July 1956, the Authority resolved to set up 
a sub-committee to define the traffic and transportation 
problem. It was charged to dec~.de what studies were 
required and to say how they were to be done. The Sub-
Committee was to enlarge its membership as necessary and 
was free to consult with any interested organisation. 2 
This Traffic and Transport Sub-Committee met for the 
first time on 14th August 1956, and comprised Mr. Somers, 
1 Regional.Planning Authority Minutes 1954 ... 57, p.143 
2 Ibid p.206 
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the City Engineer as Chairman, Messrs. E, B. Goodman 
(Ministry of Works engineer), L. J. Bentley (New Zealand 
Railways Engineer), D. P. McLellan (County Engineer 
Waimari) and Miss Northcraft. Set up by, and responsible 
to the Aut~ority, the Sub-Committee was appropriately 
given its general direction by its town planner. It is 
important to note at the outset that the entire project 
was not isolated but was disciplined within the broader 
context of the Authority 0 s planning work. In a preliminary 
report to the first meeting of the Sub-Committee, Miss 
Northcraft asked its members not merely to think in terms 
of solutions to traffic and transportation problems but to 
consider the effects of solutions on the form of the City 
and on the lives of its citizens. 1 
At a second meeting of the Sub-Committee the 
initiative was again taken by Miss Northcraft. She 
compared the methods and objectives of the recently com-
pleted Auckland Master Transportat-ion Plan with the 
Christchurch project. The Auckland Plan was in effect 
the vindication of a master roading plan already prepared 
in 19 54. In Christchurch, not only were there no master 
reading proposals to be tested but the studies on which 
1 Authority Minute Book 'Traffic and Transport 0 
August 1956 - February 1964, Pp. 2 - 4 
any roading ·proposals were partially dependent - the 
elements of a town ~lan - had hardly been begun. In 
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addition there were no major physical features in Christchurch 
determining the general direction of main routes. With 
all these factors in mind Miss Northcraft recommended that 
preLminary studies of the obvious weak points in the 
existing street system be done¢ By this means an overall 
picture could be pieced together. These studies would 
in turn lead to the development of sketch plans of highway 
systems. Miss Northcraft recommended that the collection 
of statistical information on the growth of population 
and vehicle registrations should be begun at once. Also 
suggested were a study of existing parking facilities 
and future parking neess, and a comparative study over a 
long period of the capacity of private as compared with 
public transport. 
At a meeting of the Sub-Committee on 20th June 1957, 
Mr. J. Nauta, a City Council engineer seconded to the 
Authority and working full-time on traffic and transport 
problems, reported the results of a cordon count of the 
City Centre conducted on 21st March 1957. This exercise 
was a nearly exact repetition of a cordon count conducted 
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in March 19.52 by the City Council and with which it was 
compared. The comparison defined the overall traffic 
increase and revealed a disproportionately large increase 
during the. early mc"".'ning peak period, indicating that a 
larger proportion of the increased number of car owners 
were travelling to and from work by private car. This 
indication reinforced the impression that the private car 
was the preferred means of transport for an ever increasing 
number. 
On 27th September 19.57, the Traffic and Transport 
Sub-Committee discussed two broad alternative solutions 
to the emerging problem. The first, sponsored by Mr. 
Nauta, suggested the improvement of selected radials by 
prohibiting parking and restricting the number of crossings 
and right hand turns. Ample off-street parking would be 
provided at the belts from where journeys to the City 
centre would be completed by bus. Mr. G. c. Suggate (a 
Ministry of Works Engineer who had been attending Sub-
Commi ttee meetings since February 1957), offered instead 
a plan which imposed two 'freeways 9 on the street system. 
The alternatives were merely stated - a decision on the 
form of the solution depended on further exploration of 
the problem. 
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By mid-1957 opinion was growing in the Sub-Committee 
that its work had reached a point where it would be unwise 
to continue in isolation from interests affected by the 
work, Material collected from overseas, especially 
from Britain, the Netherlands and the United States, and 
studies· already carried out had revealed a task of con-
siderable magnitude. At first though, the problem was 
thought to be only one of making good the omission of one 
or two specialist skills on the Sub-Committee. The 
Traffic Superintendent or his Deputy from the City Council 
Traffic Department were most often mentioned in this 
connection. 
In his report to the Authority for the year ended 
.31st March, 1958, Mr. Somers discussed the needs of the 
Sub-Committee in the light of the problem which was begin• 
ning to emerge. In the first place, not only were 
further specialists needed but there was a need for a 
pooling of information by organisations affected by the 
problem. This need in turn pointed to the necessity for 
new organisational arrangements to secure co-operation. 
Mr. Somers 0 report suggested the widening of Sub-
committee membership and the setting up 
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of one or more working committees. At its 11th July 
meeting the Sub-Committee clarified this suggestion when 
it recommended that the Authority establish a political 
committee of thirte"m and a separate working committee., 
When the Authority took up this suggestion to 
politicise the planning process it had two objectives. 
The immediate objective was to acquaint the Authority 9 s 
local body constituents with the development of the Plan 
so that they mi0ht be made aware of its possible effects 
on their current and future programmes., Secondly, the 
Authority 0 s purpose was to set up a political committee to 
oversee the complete definition of the problem and the 
development of a solution to it. This committee was 
intended to be representative of all the major interests 
which would be affected by the eventual solution. It 
was hoped that representatives of constituent Councils on 
the Committee would keep their Councils informed of 
progress and that when the solution was presented, would 
act as advocates fDr it~ 
On Jrd September 1958, the Authority convened a meet-
ing in the Chamber of Commerce Hall of Jocal bodies and 
interested organisations. At the close of this meeting 
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Mr. Bradshaw put a motion calling for the setting up of a 
committee not exceeding twelve. Councillor Guthrey 
seconded by Councillor Griffiths, also of the City Council, 
put an amendment to the effect that the Authority should 
be freed to work without the restriction of tbe proposed 
comm:}ttee. Mr. Bradshaw and Miss Northcroft were united 
in believing that the Authority could not use such 
freedom. They knew that in the last analysis the 
Authority could not assume, as Councillor Griffiths 
su'ggested, vvthat local authorities would give it their 
ardent support.~ 1 They were insisting that the principle 
of voluntary CQ()rdination on which the Authority operated 
must apply to this project as a special arrangement. To 
give the project some chance of success the Authority had 
to make its constituent Councils party to it from the 
beginning. 
Four speakers discussed the problem. Mr. Somers 
made the keynote contributi0n when he presented the main 
findings of th~ Traffic and Transport Sub-Committee. He 
predicted that the number of registered vehicles would 
double in the fifteen year period from 1956 to 1971 and 
that traffic on the radials in the same peri0d would increase 
1 
Minutes 9 Traffic and Transportu August 1956 -
February 1964 p.290 
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within the range of 80% to 170%. Mr. Somers also stressed 
the inter-relation of weaknesses in the existing street 
system and argued for the necessity of planning for the 
metropolitan area a~ a whole. His view was endorsed 
by Mr. A.· E. Clark, District Commissio~1er for the Ministry 
of Works who pledged tttB Department 0 s cooperation and 
support for the Authority 9 s task. Mr. J •. F~ Fardell, 
Manager of the Christchur~h Transport Bo~rd, who spoke 
third, warned the meeting of the dangerous consequences 
of planning for the use of the private car at the expense 
of public transport. He predicted that if public 
transport did not ~ 0 survive the competition of the private 
motor car 0~ then the City would be 01 turned inside out. 011 
Miss Northcroft put the project in perspective by stress-
ing the basic relationship of traffic to land use which 
meant that transportation planning must be determined 
within the wider context of town planning. 
Two days later» on 5th September, the Traffic and 
Transport Sub-Committee met to consolidate the work of 
the combined meeting. The Sub-Committee recommended that 
the proposed main committee should comprise two represent-
atives from the City Council, two from the Ministry of 
1 
Minutes •·'Traffic and Transport' 
February 196~ p.276 
August 1956 -
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Works, one from Waimari 9 two representing Riccarton, 
Kaiapoi 9 Paparua, Halswell, Heathcote and Eyre, one eaoh 
from the Christchurch Transport Board, the Automobile 
Association, a rep1 JSentative of heavy transport, Traffic 
and Transport Working Committee, and o~e other if necessary~ 
The Chairman of the Authority should be an ex officio 
member. 
The Traffic and Transport Sub-Committee also 
recommended the formation of a small working col!l1'.2ittee to 
actually do or direct the technical works and to be 
composed of technieml officers drawn from the City 
Enginee~s Department, the Ministry of Works, Waimari 
County, the City Council Traffic Department, the Transport 
Departnent and the Authorityo A senior officer was 
needed to take charge of the work and Mr~ Suggate who was 
on the spot and familiar with the work seemed to be the 
ideal man. The Ministry of Works was, therefore, 
approached with the request that Mr. Suggate be seconded 
to the Authority for twelve monthso 1 
The poiitical committee, known as the Traffic and 
Transport Advisory Committee net for the first tine on 
24th February 1959, and Miss Mary McLean, Chairman of the 
1 
Minutes 'Traffic and Transport' August 1956 -
February 19640 Pp. 256 0-8 
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City Council Traffic Conoittee, was elected Chairman without 
opposition. Yet though the Chairnanship went autonatically 
to the City Council~ Miss McLean did not possess sufficient 
standing in the Cit~ Council itself to win for the Connittee 
the authority which its sponsor, the R8gional Planning 
Authority, desired for ito She was not able to inpress 
upon the City Council the inportance and soundness of the 
work being undertaken. 
The Authority 9 s hope that the City Council would be 
favourably disposed towards the project was further pre-
judiced early in 1960 when the Authority was obliged to 
contest aspects of the City Council's district planning 
schene, In February 1960 the Authority objected to zoning 
proposals (coIIJ.Dercial and industrial) for Ferry Road on the 
grounds that since the road was a nujor outlet, development 
1 along it ought not to be encouraged. Sone Councillors 
were not anused at the spectacle of the Authority, a body 
2 
largely financed by City Council contributionsycontesting 
City Council proposals before the Town and Country Planning 
Appeal Boarda 
Although the Traffic and Transport Advisory Cor::inittee 
was largely a failure as a device to enlist City Council 
1 
Minutes of the Traffic and Transport Advisory 
Comnittee p.150 
2 65% in 1966-67 
interest and support, liaison with other territorial 
bodies was good. Mr. J. I. Co11igan 9 for instance, who 
served throughout the duration of the Committee as the 
Waimari representative kept his Council fully informed 
and therefore rather more favourably d:sposed towards 
the project. 
Other members of the Advisory Committee rendered 
important services to the project by supplementing with 
their specialist knowledge, the work of the technical 
1 officers. Mr. D. Jo Cunningham supplied invaluable 
information on truck movements and the special needs of 
heavy vehicles. Mr. J. R. Maling of the Automobile 
Association kept the wide interests of his organisation 
before the Committee and afforded t~e Authority valuable 
means t"f consultation with an influential interest group 
during the p1ann1ng process 
The working.Sub-Committee met for the first time on 
25th Mar.ch 1959. It comprised at this time Messrs. 
J. F. Fardell (Manager~ Christchurch Transport Board), 
H. B. Goodman (Ministry of Works engineer), D •. L. Hogan 
(District Officer Transport Department), c. G. Kellar 
(City Council Traffic Superintendent), D. A. Lane (District 
1 
The representative bf both the New Zealand Road 
Transport Alliance Inc. and the Christchurch and 
Suburban Carriersv and Custqmhouse Agents Associationo 
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Designing Engineer Ministry of Works ), D. Po McLellan 
(County Engineer Waimari), Miss Northcraft and Mr. 
Suggate• represented the Authority, and Mrn Somers 'Kho 
. wo.s Chairmano 
Mr. Suggate, who had been second€d to the Authority 
for one year from 12th January 1959 rad already delivered 
a majo: .. : report to the Advisory Committee on 10th March 
surveying the progress of worl~ up to that time and out-
lining work yet to be done, In this report Mr. Suggate 
discussed a programme of surveys of travel and traffic? 
and the study of the relation of this movement to the land 
use which generated itQ The intention was to use the 
surveys and other studies to build a complete picture of 
the 1959 traffic situationo Then all the variables would 
be projected up to 19800 Finally 9 four categories 8f 
transportation facilities could be :Cormulated in outline ·-
r.verall reading -requirements? service roads f'or the 
central business district, parking needs and public 
1 transport needso 
In mid-1957 most of the staff of the Authority were 
engaged in preparing and executing ten surveys carried 
out in a ten week period from mid~AuGust to mid-Octobern 
The surveys fell into three groupso Travel surveys . 
1 
~inutes of the Traffic and Transport Advisory 
Committee Ppo 6 - 9 
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sought to establish the origins, destinations, purposes, 
methods of transport and time chosen for a large sample 
of individual trips • A random sample of J,000 house-
. holds within the built-up area1 received a !r!Uestionnaire 
by post. Special log sheets were issued to 20% of the 
taxis and to a random sample of 12~% nf the trade 
..... ,. .. •' 
vehicles in the built up area. Secondly, traffic 
surveys recorded total numbers and.types of vehicles 
and their passengers. Finally, a parking survey 
recorded the number of parked vehicles both on and off 
the streets within the central traffic district in a 
twelve hour period. 2 
The method and subsequent analysis of these surveys 
were largely derived from procedure manuals issued by the 
United States Public Administration Service. Much of 
the survey material was transferred to punched cards by 
the Ministry of Works in Wellington. This informati0n 
was then converted into tables of data from which 1980 
traffic could be projected. At a meeting of the 
Technical Sub-Committee on 28th September 1961 a map 
of the City street system with estimated 1980 traffic 
assigned to it was tabled. It was agreed that 0ijpravided 
1 . 5a1 
;o of the total,. 
2 w. B. Johnston (ed.): 'Traffic in a New Zealan~ 
.Q.LE.X.:,, Appendix C 
. I 
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the pertinent assumptions and qualifications were 
included there was no reason not t~ publish the 
It was suggested that the information 
might be published in a s~ecial newspaper supplement. 
This decision to reveal the details of the problem 
opened a new phase in the planning process. 




Introduction of the Outline Plan 
Phase two of the planning process began with the 
fitting of the traffic estimate for 1980 into the existiqe 
street system. .At a meeting of the Traffic and Transpor~ 
Tedhnical Sub-C~mmittee on 26th October 1961, it was 
agreed that the Regional Plo.nning Officer might present to 
the full Authority o. map of the existing street system with 
the 1980 traffic estimate assigned to it to make clear to 
the Authority and the public the magnitude of the traffic 
1 
and transportation problem faced by the City. This 
decisi•n set in train a sequence of events leading to the 
publication of the Outline Plan in September 1962. 
When the decision was taken to reveo.l the problem it 
was assumed that the public which was now being admitted te 
the planning process would be n po.ssive entity which hnd 
merely to be convinced and would offer no protest. 
Unfortunately this proved not to be the case~ indeed the 
public revelation of the extent nnd nature of the problem 
led in tine to the loss of exclusive control of the planning 
process by the Authority. In retrospect it is possible 
to see th0t the Regional Planning Authority in 1961 - 62, 
when the Outline of the M'.lster Transport~tion Plan was 
1 
Minutes: 'Traffic.and Trnnsport 9 August 1956 -
Febru2ry 19b4; p.451 
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being de-veloped, was trapped by inconpatible objectives. 
On the one hand it was seeking to convince the public of 
the potential problen of an inadequate .roading system, in 
preparation for their introduction to the solution, On 
the other hand opinion in the Authority assuned the devel-
opnent of the solution to the detailed design stage before 
it was revealed to the public. However, the adnission 
that a solution was nearing con:Petion in outline form 
provoked a demand for its publication long before the 
Authority was ready to reveal it. 
It has been nrgucd thn t tho ossentiO.l proh.1.de to the 
publication of a plan offering the solution to a problem 
is the familiarisation of the public with the problem 
1 
alonell It is hoped that by convincingly demonstrating 
the reality of a problem resistance to the solution will 
be reduced and that public acceptance will be easy. Miss 
Northcraft was acting very much on this assumption when 
she delivered a report to the Authority on 7th November 
1961 entitled: Christchurch Master Transportation Plan 
=~Discussion of the 1280 Traffic Situation and ii§. 
Implications. While conceding the impatience of many 
to see the solution Miss Northcraft concluded that "an 
appreciation of the situation I have tried to describe is 
1 Mr., c. B. Millar 
a first essential to the understanding and proper appraisal 
1 of any proposals that are put forward. 0 So intent was the 
Authority on convincing• what it believed would be a 
sceptical public of the magnitude of the problem that Mr. 
Bradshaw overdid the drama by saying that "the implications 
which arise are quite shocking and the Master Transport-
ation Plan is going to shock the coIT!JJ.Unity to the core. 01 
2 
The very passion with which the Authority put the problem 
invited a demand for the publication of the solution as 
soon as it was formulated in outline form. 
to 
The Report presented 1iilillll the Authority on 7th November 
was essentially a commentary on a map showing the assign-
ment, to all major existing streets, of the estimated 
traffic they would be required to carry in twenty four 
hours on a September/October Wednesday in 1980. Miss 
Northcraft also acknowledged the preparation of two or 
three 'plans' and the experimental assignment of 1980 traffic 
to them. but insisted that the prin0ipal purpose of the 
Report was 0'to explain the implications of the asi:iignment 
of 1980 traffic and the situation it has revealed. i.3 
The Report predicted over the whole built-up area, 
two and one half times more vehicular trips in 1980 than in 
1 7th November Report; p.16 
2 'Press• 8th Novenber 1961. 
3 7th November Report; p.8 
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1959 and a 107% increase in trips in and out of the 
Central Business District. Heavy increases in t~affic 
over very much longer lengths of key radials could be 
expected before 1980 in many cases. An estimated 32,750 
vehicles per day would be seeking to use Colombo Street 
South in 1980 compared with 13,000 in 1961. The critical 
Bealey Avenue/Papanui Road intersection would be impassable. 




Having stressed the enormous increase of 1980 over 
1959/1961 traffic Miss Northcroft went on to offer altern.-
ative solutions in very general terms. The existing 
road system 0 s traffic capacity could be improved by 
imposing further restrictions on parking and stopping, 
to temporarily alleviate but not to solve the problem of 
the anticipated traffic increase. Alternatively, new 
routes could be built to 11ft the unmanageable burden from 
existing radials so that their traffic volumes could be 
reduced or held atY a c·mnfortable figure in the region of· 
10,000 vehicles per day. 
1 
2 
~ress' 8th November \q~I. 
Miss Northcroft was well aware that acceptance of the 
Authority 9 s estimate of the problem depended upon the 
acceptance of the forecast traffic volumes. At the 
time the Authority considered its estimate to be con-
servative and this has since been confirmed. In 
September 1962 the Outline Plan predicted a growth 
rate of vehicles on the roads of four percent per 
annum·btit between 1959 and 1963 a growth rate of six 
per cent was recorded on the radials approaching the 
betts. Report on Comments received by the Regional 
Planning Authority on the Outline Plan, p.28 
The two Christchurch papers were agreed on their 
choice of alternative • In editorials on 8th November 
the 'Press• said: "probably there is no real choice", 
while the 'Star' commented: "the plain fact is that in 
this matter, Christchurch has little choice". It seemed 
that the Authority was successfully preparing the way for 
a solution which simply could be not rejected. 
Miss Northcraft sought further opportunities to put 
the problem and prepare a climate of opinion which would 
be receptive of the solution when it was eventually offered. 
She delivered the 1980 traffic situation address at open 
meetings of the Riccarton, Paparua and Waimari Councils 
' and finally "after a great struggle'° to a meeting of the 
City Council on Jrd May 1962. Fourteen councill0rs from 
a total of twenty were present. The most successful 
meeting in terms of attendance was organised by the Canterbury 
Chamber of Commerce on 12th June. One hundred people 
were present. 
In her 7th November Report, Miss Northcraft referred 
rather ambiguously to two or three 'plans' to which the 
1980 traffic estimate was being experimentally assigned. 
At the confidential level of meetings of the Traffic and 
Transport Technical Sub-Committee on 26th October and 
48 
20th November 1961, a tentative proposal showing a motorway 
running towards the City centre on a line East of Papanui 
Road was under considern.tion as a de:rionstration of "the 
order of magnitude of a IJ.otorway type solution. 01 On 
22nd February 1962, the Technical Sub-Committee approved a 
report on the progress of alternative outline proposals to 
be suboitted by Miss Northcraft to the Traffic and Transport 
Advisory Co:rioittee. This Report was an explanation and 
comoentary on four naps showing the location of ~our 
possible motorway systems and related roads, designated 
MTP1, MTP2, MTPJ and MTP4o All were devised by Mr. 
Suggate and each was to some extent a development of the 
design which preceded it. The Report was intended to 
demonstrate the complexity of the problem of designing 
an acceptable solution which must inevitably involve major 
works. It made no recommendations though it implied by 
its account ~f the development of the sequence that MTP4 
was the most likely form. 
On 8th May, Miss Northcroft delivered a second major 
Report to the Authority which went much further than the 
first in its anticipation of the solutiqno Miss Northcraft 
stated cetegorically for the first tir..e in public- thnt some 
1 Minutes Traffic and Transpor~, August 1956 -
February-r964. Pc452 
urban notorways would have to be built. She indicated 
that four motorway plans and two nodifications had been 
developed and that the most pronising was being tested for 
its ability to cope with estimated traffic in 1980 and 
beyond. The princ:ipal component of this Plan when fully 
developed was a ten nile motorway systen within the 1980 
urban fence. Related nain objectives in a plan hinging 
on this "network of arterial roads superinposed on the 
existing road systen°', were a conplenentary parking plan 
and provision for the developnent of a "rapid transport 
systen. it1 
In the first section of this Report Miss Northcroft 
declared the intention of the planning tean to prepare and 
subnit to the Authority as soon as was possible a 91 basic 
outline plan showing the general location and the Dajor 
im.provecents required to the existing street system. 
This butline plan can then be used as the basis for dis-
cussion with local authorities in the region and with 
Government Departcents and, when agreeoent has been 
reached, can becone the transportation section of the 
Regional Planning Scheue. 112 
In ter~s of a three phase developnent of the Master 
Transportation Plan devised by the Technical Sub-Committee 
1 8th May Report p.,2 
2 Ibid p, 12 
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at its neeting on 22nd June 1961, phase two - the assess-
nent of deficiencies and the development of tentative 
solutions - was nearing conpletion with the anticipated 
presentation of the outline solution. After the incor-
poration of this outline solution into the Regional Schene 
the legal responsibility of the Authority would be at an 
end. Phase three, the developnent of the chosen solution 
in detail, and its execution 9 was the responsibility of the 
local bodies and the Governuent Departnents which would 
pay for the works~ 
The Authority now feared, as Miss Northcroft made 
clear in her 8th May Report, the end of developmeht of 
the Master Transportation Plan after it was incorporated 
into the Regional Scheme unless arrangements were made in 
advance for the execution of detailed design worko It 
was even uncertain as to who could or would do the work. 
Miss Northcraft in her Re~ort suggested the National Roads 
Board and the local bodies, or alternatively the Authority 
itself. Commenting on the choice the 'Press' took it for 
granted that the Authority must do the detailed design work. 1 
But even if the Authority were the obvious choice it would 
have to be confirmed by negotiation between the parties 
concerned. Miss Northcraft estimated that if the 
1 
'.!:~' 11th May 1962. 
Authority were to be g~ven the responsibility it would 
need an annual income of between £25,000 and £JO,OOO as 
1 
compared with its current income of around £18,000. 
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Discussion of the Authority's requirements were pre-
mature until it was certain that the Authority was to be 
given the responsibility, a decision on which the Authority 
urgently required. At a meeting of the i~uthori ty on 4th 
July, Mr. Bradshaw suggested that at the meeting of local 
bodies shortly to be called by the Authority to discuss 
6he Outline Plan 9 the Dost important issue to be decided 
was not local body approval for the Outline but the question 
of who was to do the detailed design. Mr. Bradshaw 
suggested that a special meeting of local bodies should be 
called 'l!;:o consider the question '.)f the continued develop-
ment of the Plan even before the Outline was ready to be 
considered. 2 
The Authority 9 s preoccupation with the progressive 
development of the Plan was not shared by interested 
parties outside the Authority. The interested layman LOW 
knew just enough about the form of the solution to want to 
know moreo As the 'Star' put it in an editorial on 1Jth 
June, while the public sought more information "the 
planners (wish) not to be disturbed in their planning.vi 
1 8th May Report 
2 
'f~' 5th July 1962. 
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Quite possibly the Authority had a further motive 
for keeping the solution confidential. Authority members 
might reasonably have assumed that while the details of the 
solution were known only to themselves and the constituent 
Councils it would remain a frozen political issue. Con-
stituent local bodies of the Authority would be acquainted 
with the Plan in a political vacuum and their support for 
its continued development by the Authority would thus be 
easily obtained. 
If the Authority had beon able to sell what it con-
sidered to be a very good case for keeping the Plan con-
fidential, then the history of the Master Transportation 
Plan might have been very different. The Plan would have 
been advanced to a stage where opposition to its proposals 
would have been 1 1 g 79 a futile gesture. Development of 
the Outline continued in mid-1962 on this very assumption 
that it would shortly be submitted in a floxible form to 
constituent Councils in closed session. 
On 24th May 1962, the Traffic and Transport Technical 
Sub-Committee resolved thc,t the City Council might be 
advised that the Outline Plan was nearly complete and that 
a meeting of local bodies to discuss it could soon be 
arranged. Mr, Suggate advised the Sub-Committee on this 
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occasion that the assignment of the 1980 traffic estimate 
to the latest development of the plan designated MTP4B, 
was now complete. The Sub-Committee then agreed to adopt 
MTP4B and that this plan, further modified in detail as 
necessary should be placed before the projected meeting of 
local body representatives for approval in principle. It 
was decided that an alternative to the route across Hagley 
Park shown on MTP4B should be investigated and included in 
the submission to the meeting. 1 
It has been argued that in town planning a solution 
emerges out of a consideration of all the relevant factors 
and that there are no real alternatives - the balance of 
2 s advantage points in one direction only. haring a 
similar attitude the Technical Sub-Co:CTLJ.ittee was preparing 
a conplete solution with the exception of an alternative 
proposal for one aspect of its Plan which in the context 
of the project as a whole was of little real significance. 
City Council represent2tives though, at the 27th February 
neeting of the Traffic and Transport Advisory Committee 
had already expressed misgivings at the possibility of a 
route across North Hagley Park as shown in MTP4. The 
Authority confidently anticipated approval in principle on 
Technical grounds for a co~plex technical p:oposal, with 
1 
2 
Minutes Traffic nnd Transport August 1956 -
February-r~ Pp.480-481 ~ 
Mr. c. B. Millar 
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special provision being nade for n choice on political 
grounds between alternative proposals for this one aspect. 
In mid-1962 the Authority was determined not to reveal 
the Outline Plan to the general public. The Authority 
had legitinate reasons for wishing the keep the Plan con-
fidential antil detailed design work was done, quite apart 
from any suspicion that approval would be harder to obtain 
under public scrutiny. It wished above all else to avoid 
the alarm and uncertainty which had followed a suggestion 
by the Ministry of Works some years earlier, for a motorway 
in the Marshlands Road area to link up with the Northern 
outlet. Mr. Bradshaw did not seek to exaggerate or mis-
lead when he told the Authority that he was convinced 
publication of the Outline would lead to ~confusion and 
Chaos. 91 1 Publication of the Plan or parts of the Plan 
could not be contenplated until detailed design work had 
been done so that property owners would know exactly how 
they would be affected. 
However, not everybody shared the Authority's view of 
the dangers of publicationQ In an editorial on 13th June 
the ~· in answer to Mr, Bradshaw's assertion to the 
Mairehau Residents' Association that if the Outline Plan 




'1:~' 4th July 1962. 
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Comnenting on adverse editorinl comment in both 
papers - the 'Press' followed the 'Star' on 15th June, 
saying that the Authority's failure to publish would only 
increo.se its embarr'lssment - Mr. Bradshaw argued that the 
criticism was based on a misunderstanding. The Outline 
he stresse~ would only give a loose indication of the site 
of proposed works which must cause anxiety and confusion 
which in turn could not be resolved until detailed planning 
was done. The 'Star' remained unconvinced and the 
following day (4th July) took the matter up again. It 
endorsed the opinion of Mr. R. c. Neville (Waimari County 
Council) the one voting member of the Authority who 
opposed the no publication decision. Mr. Neville had 
argued that once released to the local bodies the Outline 
would become widely known, almost certainly in distorted 
form. The editorial threatened darkly that the Regional 
Planning Authority risked the destruction of its gradually 
built up good relations with the community. 
These arguments contributed towards a complete reversal 
of the Authority's attitude. Authority members gradually 
came to see the Plan as so extensive an~ about to be revealed 
to so many local body members that it could not possibly 
be kept secret. Though the Authority started with the 
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unquestioned assumption that the Outline Plan could not 
under any circumstances be published yet it slowly became 
clear that publication could not be avoided. On 4th 
September when the Authority adopted the Plan in principle 
Mr. Bradhsaw said that he still believed that publication 
must cause confusion among property owners but that he was 
now persuaded that on balance the Outline Plan was best 
made public. He conceded that the Plan could not be kept 
secret once it was revealed to local bodies, that some 
would take advantage of their special knowledge and that 
details were bound to be distorted. Mr. Bradshaw admitted 
that editorials in both papers, critical of the Authority 0 s 
original decision not to publish had not been without 
effect on the Authorityo Again he emphasised that the 
Outline to be published would be in diagrammatic form 
only and that routes shown were liable to be shifted two 
-three chains either way, 1 
. By adopting the Plan in principle and "submitting it 
to Councils as a basis for discussion ov 2 the Authority 
reorganised its planning timetable. Under the terms of 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1953, if a constituent 
council of a Regional Planning Authority fails to approve 
any section of a Regional Scheme within four months of its 
1 19,E~" 5th September 1962. 
2 Ibid 
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submission to it, the Authority can go to the Town and 
Country Planning Appeal Board for decisi·on. 1 If the 
Board decides in favour of the Authority then the disputed 
plan becomes an operative section of the Regional Scheme 
and binding on the reluctant local body. By merely sub-
mi ttin.g the Outline Plan to the Councils for discussion 
and allowing until 31st March 1963 for comments on it, the 
Authority had adapted the formal requirements of the Act 
to take account of a nore complex political situation. 
Only after putting the Outline Plan to the test of open 
public discussion and after considering comments arising 
out of this would the Authority go ahead with the procedure 
of making the Plan an op~rative part of the Regional 
Scheme. 
Now that the Authority had conceded the need to argue 
for its proposals in the wider conte.-t of full public 
discussion it had to deal with the problem of presentation. 
The process of argument leading to a reversal of the decision 
on publication absorbed the Authority for quite some time. 
When the decision was finally taken the Authority found 
itself facing. a contingency for which it was oonpletely 
unprepared. Because the Authority failed to work out the 
implications of its decision to publish the Outline proved 
1 
Town and Country Planning Act 19.53 Section 10(6) 
an unsatisfactory document and a handicap to the planning 
process. 
Yet the Authority was not unaware that the way in 
which the Plan was first presented and argued for might be 
critical. It was important that the publicQs first 
impression should be a favourable one, or at least that 
hostility should be anticipated and that potentially 
objectionable features should be presented in such a light 
as to minimise opposition. Miss Northcroft in particular 
was aware of these considerations for when it became clear 
that publication was probable she suggested that a good 
journalist be engaged to 9write up 9 the Plan from a layman°s 
point Qf view. Funds for such a purpose were available n 
the form of a £1 9 000 trust fund, set up some years before 
by the i:..u thori ty, for just such en irregular expe:r..se. 
This suggestion was declined by the Authority 
principally because of the delay it would cause. Early 
publication was desired in the hope that the way would 
then be clear for a decision on the problem of how and by 
whom the .developnent of· the Plan was to be continued. 
In addition,the Authority could not ~e convinced of the value 
of taking a special initiative in the public debate which 
publication ·would begin1 
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Consequently The Christchurch Master Transportation 
Plan1 which was revealed to a meeting of constituent local 
bodies of the Authority on 10th September and subsequently 
published, was very different fron the subjective argument 
which Miss Northcraft would have liked to replace, or at 
least parallel it. Its intention was merely to inform. 
It made no pretension to enlist support for its proposals. 
Nor did it anticipate objections and seek to overcome them 
in advance. The one obviously provocative aspect of the 
Plan - the Hagley Park section of the Fendalton-Avonside 
motorway - appeal!'ed in the text' without special comment 
or justification. In a late and unsuccessful effort to 
minimise this intrusion it was suggeste<t that the motorway 
be shown on the line of Harper Avenue as far as the 'elbow' 
This proposal was rejected because at that time it was not 
known for certain that all of Harper Avenue would not be 
needed in addition to the motorway and it was thought 
better to be frank than risk being accused of deception 
at a later date. Determined merely to present the 9 facts 0 
the Authority was prepared to meet its critics with one 
weapon alone. - a determined repetition of the fact thnt 
2 
the Plan was an 'outline only 0 • 
1 
2 
Christchurch Regionnl Planning Authority. September 1962 
Miss Northcraft who edited the Plan told the author 
that she considers that even a limited attempt by the 
Authority to present the Plan more persuasively would 
have been of value in influencing first reactions. 
She considers that another nonth would have been 
sufficient for the Authority itself to recast the 
Plan in a minimally palatable form. 
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As published the Master Transportation Plan merely 
set out the assumptions, estimates and facts which had yet 
to be fought over. The introduction very briefly outlined 
the surveys on which the Plan was based. Part (ii) 
evaluated future problems, Part (iii) dealt with design 
considerations and Part (iv) set out the Plan. Working 
from the assumption that the Central Traffic District 
and the Central Industrial District (the two roughly 
bounded by Sali.Jbury Street, Fitzgerald Avenue, Wordsworr.h 
Street and Hagley Park) were, and would continue to be, 
the major generators of traffic in the region, the 
Authority set out a roading scheme to serve· the City in 
1980 and beyond. And the Plan makes it clear that its 
reading proposals imply - for it does not set out - a 
complementary master vehicle parking scheme. (An 
estimated 18,000 off-street parking places would be 
required in 1980 compared with a total of 8,000 on and 
off-street parkirtg places in 1959.) Just as the reading 
scheme is designed to be implemented in stage~, so a 
\ 
programme of parking building construction must be planned 
to absorb the rising flood of vehicles carried by the 
developing road network. This combination of an adequate 
road network a,nd matching parking facilities is the necessary 
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pre-requisite to the full use of the City centre amel!lltdom: 
and services. In a fundamental sense the Plan is more 
than a roading plan but rather a plan for the optimum use, 
by an expanding regional population, of the facilities of 
the City centre. The private car happens to be the 
dominant mode of transport and the Plan sets out to provide 
means for its efficient use and its minimal nuisance when 
out of use. 
A basic deGign consideration of the Plan was "the 
need to keep the Central Business District, which forms 
the inn0r part of the Central Traffic District, as free 
from traffic as possible''. 1 Since the Plan as published 
was an Outline only it was quite appropriate that the 
detail of arrangements inside the proposed motorway box 
were not offered. Yet it is a major failure of the Outline 
Plan that it c-,r:1 tteci to give sone account of how the motor-
way system serving the city centre could be'made compatible 
wl th the ain of preserving the street system "as free from 
traffic as possible" ·• 
In her second najor Report to the Authority on 8th 
May 1962, Miss Northcroft said that Uthe solution to the 
traffic problens in the centre '1s the nost difficult and 
1 Qbristchurch Master Transportation Plan p.16 
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conplex which has to be faced." The Re port went on: 
11 It is one (problem) which cannot be completely divorced 
from the consideration of the overall network of urban 
routes, for the location of and in particular the points 
of entry to the centre of these routes, will affect the 
question of how and where traffic is distributed and 
collected in the centre and the location of such facilities 
as car parks and bus terminals."1 
As early ac 27th June 1958, Mr. D. J, Edmondson, 
Deputy Regional Planner, had presented a report to the 
Traffic and Transport Sub-Committee outlining an approach 
to the problem of the layout of the City centre to complement 
an arterial reading plan. It advocated a 11system of main 
vehicular thoroughfares as a super-grid within the frame-
work of the present grid. 9~ A report to the Authority 0s 
Technical Advisory Committee on 1st July 1958, gave the 
principles of design informing this scheme to be on the 
one han~ provision for vehicular movement within reasonarle 
distance of any poin4 while at the same time pedestrians 
must be free to move about in •complete safetyu.3 
Development of a super-grid to achieve these purposes 




8th May 1962 Report by Miss Northcroft to the 
Authority p.5 
Minutes Traffic and Transport, August 1956 -
Febr~ary--r§'b4. p.227 
Minutes of the Authority 0 s Technical Advisory Committee 
1955 - May 1959 p.222 
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streets would gradually b~ phased out as vehicular traffic 
routes and some at least would ultimately become pedestrian 
streets. In a later report to the Technical Advisory 
Committee Miss Northcroft warned that the probl.en of 
gaining rear access to buildings was the major barrier 
preventing the realisation of such a scheme for the 
segregation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic. 1 
Not only was the problen of layout broached early 
but sone work wc...s done in 1961-62 on the assignment of 
1980 traffic to the city centre streets, This complex 
undertaking of assigning 1980 traffic to city centre 
destinations (based o~ the 1980 distribution of employnent 
and city services) was undertaken as a guide to the 
positioning of motorway access points and the distribution 
of off-street car parking. 2 None of this in.formation 
appeared in the published Outline with the result that 
the Authority laid itself open to the charge that it had 
been responsible for the preparation of a mere ~reading 
planff which threatened to destroy the very facilities it 
was designed. to serve. 
The Plan makes it clear (1in ·Part (iii) Design 
Considerations) that the reading proposals which it makes 
1 Ibid p.285 
2 8th May Report to the Authority by Miss Northcroft. 
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neet the different type and standard of facilities 
required by the different purposes of traffic. It compares 
the traffic capacity, purposes and destructiveness of three 
broad alternatives which are not mutually exclusive but 
which will be nixed in the Plan proposals as appropriate. 
The three categories are the widening of existing roads 9 
the construction of new all-purpose roads and the con-
struction of motorways. Each of the first two serve two 
functions - theJ carry traffic and they give access to 
adjoining property. Motorways perforo only the one 
function of carrying traffic and they are designed to 
avoid any interruption in their traffic flow. In the Plan 
the ootorway is a specialist road super-inposed on an 
inadequate street system to permit the continued functioning 
of a pattern of urban life becooing heavily dependent on 
the use of the private car. It is precisely because the 
- . 
private car is the chosen neans of transport in a city of 
Christchurch's r:J.oderate size and circular spread that 
other forms of transport, notably an extended bus service, 
will not meet the population~ transport needs. 
The backbone of the Plan is a system of two motorways 
(the Northern and the Southern) linked by an elaborate 
interchange about three blocks South of the Railway Station. 
This system's prime function is to serve as an urban 
motorway, and secondarily as a long-distance motorway. 
The Northern motorway fron the vicinity of Chaney's 
Corner to Broughan Street is designed to relieve Papanui 
Road, Cranford Street and the Papanui Road/Bealey Avenue 
intersection. It passes close to the East side of the 
Central Traffic District and utilises the network of 
roads West of Fitzgerald Avenue as collector-distributors. 
This street netnork provides what is called a Htangential 
approach~, 1 to the Central Traffic District. That is, it 
offers a nunber of alternative approaches to the city 
centre and has the effect of progressively breaking down 
the heavy traffic concentration from the notorway. The 
Southern notorway runs fron the Main South Road beyond 
Tenpleton, to the junction with the Northern motorway. 
It passes South of the Railway Station so that it may 
serve the Central Industrial District as well as ~he 
Central Business District. Like the Northern mot•rway 
its prime purpose is to relieve overloaded radials : 
Lincoln Road, Blenheim Road and Riccarton Road. The 
Fendalton - Avonside motorway is designed to relieve 
congested intersections at Carlton Mill Bridge and 
1 
Christchurch_Master Transportation Plag 
Diagram 1 p.19 
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Papanui Road/Bealey Avenue. Its essential purpose is to 
provide an alternative route to Bealey Avenue for traffic 
approaching the North of the City centre from the West, 
especially the Airport. Salisbury and Peterborough 
Streets as a one-way pair will act as collector-distributors • 
.An important feature of the Plan is the extension of the 
tangential approach to the North-West and West approaches 
to the Central Traffic District. This would be achieved 
from the Fendal ~·on - Avonside motorway itself" By 
connecting the Southern m~torway with Rolleston Avenue via 
a bridge at the Antigua boatsheds so that traffic from the 
Southern motorway wou~d have the option of approaching the 
City centre from the West, the Plan effectively encircled 
the Central Traffic District with major routes from which 
traffic uould infiltrate. 
The text of the Plan concludew with a brief discussion 
of economic considerations. It estimates that tlie cost of 
twenty miles of I!lotorways (ur121an and.rural) will be in the 
vicinity of £20 Dillion. The cost of the other new roads 
and im.proveoents would be additional to this estimate. It 
is pointed.out, however, that the construction of the 
motorways avoids the alternative of widening the radials. 
Such an alternative the Plan argues, would fail for it would 
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' have no reserve capacity at the end of the planning period. 
The notorway systen is planned to have a significant 
reserve capacity beyond 1980 and additions to it beyond 
this tine are allowed for. 
In a sense any plan such as the Outline Master 
Transportation Plan intended as a basis for public dis-
cuss ion, is a liability to the planning process no matter 
how attractive or persuasive it appears. Such a plan 
has one signifi.)ance for the technical experts who produce 
it and quite another for the lay audience which considers 
it. A plan is never a static thing but is a continuing 
process of developmenc and adjustment. Because a lay 
audience shares no experience of this process a published 
plan appears fixed and finished. Though the authors of 
a plan may stress that their formal statement of it is 
only a single frame from a reel of film a plan published 
for public scrutiny inevitably appears a still. It 
specifies details, worst of all it shows proposals on a 
map which the layman is liable to consider firm decisions •. 
The Authority was now burdened with the defence of its 
proposals from the relatively inflexible ground which the 
Outline had established. The more elaborate justifications 
and fresh arguments which the Authority was now required 
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to give carried the unmistakeable taint of second thoughts, 
even of excuses. This is not to suggest that the Outline 
could possibly have anticipated and met every objection, 
it is simply that the Authority had now to put too many 
arguments which should have been in the Plan. 
The Outline Plan was revealed to a meeting of local 
body and Government Department representatives and 
others closely concerne~ at a special meeting on 10th 
September 1962. Large portions of the text and accompany-
ing naps were published i~ both papers the following day. 
Mr. Bradhsaw's introductory remarks anticipated the two 
immediate criticisms: The problen of cost and the notor-
way route across North Hagley Park. As to the cost, an 
estimate of £50 nillion was "a piece of unintelligent 
guesswork" and he urged his audience to "expunge" that 
1 figure fron their ninds. On the Hagley Park route he 
said that the Authority knew that nany people 9'sincerely 
believed that Hagley Park should be preserved at all 
costs°'. 'However, 11 evf'J;ry conceivable alternative had been 
studied and tested, and cast. out when it became unworkable~ 
before it was decided to plpn for a ootorway through the 
2 
Park". Only two questions cane froo the audience and 
1 
"§~!: 11 11th Septenber 1962. 
2 Ibid 
one of these was put by Mr. Ho J. Walker, M.P. for 
St. Albans, the assiduous local member who queried the 
siting of the route of the Northern motorway through his 
electorate. For the ;t'est the audience were silent and 
the oi~vr said in its editorial comment, "with good 
reason Christchurch people are entitled to feel startled 
1 




Reactions to the Published Outline: 
SeptembeL1.2,62_:: March 1963. 
Both Christchurch papers were given a full account 
of the Outline Plan a week to ten days before it was 
published. They thus had ample time to consider the 
form of their editorial comment to be published on 11th 
September 1962, the day after the Plan was revealed to 
the publico While the 'Star' dwelt on the size and 
unfortunate implications of the Plan? the 9 Press' 
reinforced the argument of the Plan itself without 
serious criticism or reservation. The 0 Pre§..§.' committed 
itself to wholehearted support of the Plan but the 
'Star' restricted itself to the comment that "undoubtedly 
by 1980 something will be needed to avoid ccmplete and 
utter congestion of the central area of Christchurch, so 
that it is wise to start planning now for some form of 
relief. Qo 
The 'St§:.r.' stressed that the Plan was liable to 
alteration before it was further developed and argued 
that sufficient time mt:1St he allowed for study of all 
its implications. Whereas the '~' stressed the 
effects of the Plan on existing interests, (both private 
and public pr:;perty notably Hagley Park), the 'Press! 
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emphasised the necessity for the Plan and the benefits 
it would confer. Noting that the Plan proposals were 
"painstakingly prepared by a process of theoretical 
trial and errorQ1 the 'Press 0 commented that it was 
unlikely that the local authorities could improve on 
them. 
Technical proposals such as the Master Transport-
ation Plan can ultimately be tested and judged only in 
terms of the professional training of which they are a 
product. Newspaper leader writers like local body 
members must rely on the advice of technical experts. 
Since the Regional Planning Authority had a virtual 
monopoly of the experts it seemed that fundamental debate 
on the merits of the Plan was not possible. Only if 
there were a second and independent set of technical 
experts disputing the methods, assumptions and proposals 
of the Plan would the layman have a chcice. From the 
beginning the 'Pre.§§.' did not seek a choice. The 
'Star' on the other hand had serious misgivings and 
awaited developments. 
The layman, confronted with a plan of which he 
disapproves such as the Macter Transportation Plan, but 
without Yival groups of technical specialists offering 
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arguments between which he can choose, is in a frustrating 
position. The Authorit~ confident of the technical 
inviolability of its proposals to non-specialists found 
that the frustration engendered by the situation had 
unfortunate consequences. It helped to stimulate an 
emotional reaction to aspects of the Plan which could 
be readily exploited by those who eventually did offer 
valternativesv. 
Correspondence in both papers followLgg the 
publication of the Plan dealt wlmost exclusively with the 
route of the Fendalton-Avonside motorway across North 
Hagley Park. Preoccupation with this one aspect was so 
overwhelming that the 'Starv published letters not under 
the heading '0the Traffic Plan°Q but simple the "Hagley 
Motorway 11 • From 12th September 1962 to 20th October 
when correspondence on the subject was suspended in the 
'Pre.§.§. 1 1 fourteen correspondents opposed the intrusion 
on the Park while four explicitly approved the route. 
In the peniod 12th September to JOth November when 
correspondence petered out in the 'Sta~ 9 , twenty six 
correspondents opposed the Park roQd while seven approved 
it. On one side R, D. Tranter in a letter published in 
the 'Star' on 16th October, called Hagley Park 00 the dead 
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heart of Christchurch and a block to progress" while 
Janet Kenny wrote: 01 This gradual destruction of our green 
spaces is unforgiveable. Without Hagley Park, 
Christchurch would be sordid."1 
The local body elActions occured just as this 
argument was developing but they hardly affected them. 
Individual candidates for the City Council, on both the 
Labour and Citizens 0 tickets, declared their opposition 
to the route acr0ss the Parke Councill.Jr P. J. Skellerup 
(Citizensq) declared his personal opposition to a road 
through Hagley Park and suggested that the Park road 
proposal might prove tn be a red herring desisned to 
2 
draw fire from other proposals. At least one other 
Citizens' candidate (R. H. Hammond) publicly stated his 
opposition with the statement~ "If I am elected a 
3 motorway will run through Hagley Park over my dead body. 01 
A Labour Party candidate for the City Council, Mrs. 
Gertrude Cree, charged that the proposal was nthe thin 
end of the wedge 01 and that Citizens' Councillors who 
represented the City on the Regional Planning Authority 
4 0'had proved lacking in vision and too weak to say NO i 0'. 
Councillor Ra M$ Macfarlane, challgnged to state his 
l 9 Pre&§_ 9 18th September 1962. 
2 'Sta,£' 4th October 1962. 
3 'Star 0 10th October 1962. 
4 'PressQ 5th Ootober 19~2. 
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views, expressed opposition. 1 
Yet waiting for a lead from the public rather than 
seeking to lead, the parties as bodies made no mention 
of the Plan as a party issue. In fact, after the 
Eleution ai correspondent in the 0 Starw queried Labour 
Party policy on the Hagley Park route. Miss Mabel 
Howard M.P., replying for the Party, stated that there 
had not been sufficient time b€fore the Elections to 
work out policy on the issue. 
2 
In the absence of a political division, firmer and 
more clearly opposed positions were being taken up by 
the two newspapers. u~ 19th November 1962, represent-
atives of the Regional Planning Authority 9 s constituent 
Councils met to approve in principle, a resolution 
charging the Authority with responsibility for continued 
development of the Plan. 
confirmed its support for the Plan by urging that it be 
quickly proceeded with while the 0§tar' endorsed the 
principle of "hastening slowlyn. 3 This developing 
division of editorial opinion was helping to structure the 
debate on the Plan. It became an important factor in 




'St§:!:' 22nd October 1962. 
J 
'Press' 24th November 1962, and '§tar' 20th 
November 1962. 
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Opposition to the Plan remained disorganised and 
unimpressive. It seemed that the Authority had only 
to wait until initial hostile reactions cooled. Yet 
the Authority did not welcome this state of affairs. At 
a meeting of the Authority on 6th November, Mr~ Bradshaw 
deplored the fact that comments on the Plan so far 
received had been confined tu one aspect. He went on 
to say that wthere are many proposals affecting much 
property and the sights of the public generally and 
1 
local bodies must be focussed on the Plan as a whole. 01 
Preoccupation with the route of the Fendalton-AvonsidQ 
motorway endangered the progress of the Plan because it 
made for argument in emotional terms with which the 
Authority was least able to cope, Paradoxically, the 
stimulus required to focus public attention on °the 
Plan as a whole" could only be provided by a body which 
was prepared to fight the Plan on the widest front and 
in the most dramatic way possibleo 
A request for an extension of the time allowed by 
the Regional Planning Authority for the submission of 
comments on the Plan marked the opening of an entirely 
new phase in the debate. This request was made in a 
letter to the Editor of the 9 Press 9 over the names of 
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Dr. P. S. Cook and Messrs. H. G. Royds and P. J. Beaven. 
However, it was not printed in the correspondence columns 
but in short article form and was referred to as a 
11 joint statement on behalf of a group of citizens interested 
in studying the Plan, ii 1 On 12th November the 0Press 0 
printed a letter in its correspondence colum~s from 
Dr. Cook protesting at the use made of the original 
letter which he charged, had been reworded 0 rearranged 
and given prominence as the statement of a group. 
This second letter does, however, admit to the existence 
of a group of twenty people attempting to study the Plan 
with only two copies to worl{ from. 2 
Commenting on tho request for the extension of 
time allowed for comments, the 0Press 0 indicated a very 
narrow estimate of the purpose for which the original 
period was conceded~ It said that 19 the Authority, in 
giving the public until March 31st to make comments and 
suggestions is already going far beyond what the law 
requires. The Authority 0 s real responsibility is only 
to the Constituent local bodies and to the Government. 11 
The Authority was merely 11 giving the public a chance to 
be heard before it finally approves the Plan for sub ... 




0 Press 0 9th November 1962. 
The Outline was not published in any quantity till 
the end of December 1962 
vPress 0 10th November 1962. 
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surprising that this cnmmentator considered the period 
for comments merely as an opportunity for members af the 
public to talk out their misgivings with a tolerant 
Planning Authority. The extension of this opportunity 
into a full-scale contest between ostensibly equal 
opponents, the one attacking and the other defending the 
Plan, could hardly have been anticipated. 
On 22nd December 1962, both papers carried an 
article on the formation of a group of professional men 
to examine the implications of the Plan. The conveners 
of the Group were Messrs~ Beaven and Royds. 1 Some of 
the people contacted by Dr. Cook had already worked 
to~ether in an organisation protesting the destruction 
of the scenic beauty of Lake Manapouri by a proposed 
hydro-electric scheme. Membership of the new gr01.1.p 
was not given but it was reported to include consulting 
engineers (Mr. Royds), architects (Mro Beaven), 
accouncants, university lecturers, quantity surveyors, 
do~tors, teachers, and lecturers in art and design. 2 
The Group which adopted the name of the City Planning 
Study Group had already met Mr. D. J. Edmondson (the 
Deputy Regional Planner) and Mro Suggate to have the Plan 
explained. Their preliminary comment on the Plan was 
1 Dr. Cook, who had taken the initiative in forming 
the Group, had shifted to Australia, 
2 
'§ta~' 22nd December 1962~ 
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that q'the Planners have produced a workable roading 
system, but the City wants more than a traffic plan 
This first statement of their views stressed 
their belief that traffic planning is only one aspect 
of town planning which, if an isolated project such as 
the Master Transportation Plan appeared to be, endangered 
a potential town plan as a whole. Town planning 
according to the Group is a 'rteam endeavourq~ and , the 
Regional Plann ins; Authority team which produced the Plan 
less than adequate in this respect. A properly balanced 
town planning team included architects, engineers, 
sociologists, doctors, lawyers and landscape architects 
in addition to town planners and traffic engineers. 
The Group expressed its eagerness to supply these 
missing skills on some sort of informal consultative 
2 
basis. 
But the City Planning Study Group anticipated 
another role when in this first statement 1 t commented that 
0~Although loc;.l bodies can still protest, the scheme is 
too big and too complex, and of too diverse implications 
for individual local bodies to materially alter it. It 
is this kind of gap which our group would welcome an 
opportunity to help to fill. 09 .3 Group objectives at 
1 




this early stage were unclear. Some members~ probably 
a minority, were bitterly opposed to any intrusion on 
Hagley Park. Messrs. Beaven and Royds who were the 
.anchormen throughout were largely unconcerned at this 
aspect of the Plan. However, Group members were agreed 
on a minimal intention of forcing the Authority t0 
reconsider the Plan9 to re-think the entire problem in 
a broader context. 
The Group's general intention was to Qo spur the 
professional jealousy of the Authori tyQ1 • 1 Messrs. 
Beaven and Royds as members of professions closely 
allied to town planning and traffic engineering 
(architecture and civil engineering respectively) were 
determined to enforce their claim to professional 
competence in planning matters. By stressing their 
professional kinship with the technical officers of the 
Authorit;w they were demanding an equal right to be 
heard in any debate on the technical fundamentals of 
the Plan. Unlike the general public they would not be 
told that they must in the last analysis accept the 
results of a professional inquiry on faith. The 
Group were determined to fully open up a debate which 
the Authority assumed must necessarily remain half 
1 P. J. Bea~en Interview. 
closed, tbe decision going to tbe originators "lf tbe 
Plan '1y default. 
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Uncertain as to bo)N pest to acbieve tbeir aims, a 
. dele,=:ation from tbe Group met l\/lr. George Burns, E:di tor 
of tbe 'St§r' to discuss tbe problem, At bis suggestion 
tbe Group began tbe preparatir)TI .of a series of nevvspaper 
articles on tbe Plan. Nben the 'Pr~~~' was approached 
the Editor, Mr. Cant, was not enthusiastic but agreed 
that bis !)aper would carry a similan~ series. Like 
1".'.r~ Burns be stressed that contributors must not indulge 
in extr:rvagant polemics. 
In an editorial on 22nd January 1963 the 'P~ess' 
introduced the first in a series of fi17e articles on the 
Plan by members of the City Planning Study Group. On 
11th February the 'Star' printed the first of a separate 
series by Group members. In its editorial introduction 
the 'Press' made it clear that it did not necessarily 
agree witb tbe content of these articles and warned that 
any proposals made would ha· e to be carefully irn78stigated 
before they could be cJnsidered. This leader Writer 
touched on a grave weakness of the Group despite its 
claims to profes~iorial authority - the total lack of 
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resources witb wbicb to substantiate even a minor 
alteratiol'.l to tbe official Plan. Any suggestion made 
would have to be evaluated by the Autbority. 
In b otb series the fifth and last article ace ompanied 
.by a sketch plan, was the approved work of tbe Group as 
a whole. Each of the other eight was signed and 
represented a personal point of view. Mr. F. Tomlinson
1 
2 
nnd Mr. Gorclon Troup made highly partisan contributions 
to the 'Star' series. Mr. TomliDson charged tbat the 
Plan ignored buman and aestbetic values, that it was 
destructive of public and private property, and threatened 
11 blighted areas", merely to achieve - at the cost of 
more thal'.l £40 mi+lj.on - better traffic flow. He also 
asked whether acceptance of the Plan meant "the building 
up of but an other semi-government department with almost 
unlimited powers; the engagement of unkl'.l own ov9-rseas 
traffic engineers (devoid of local experience and 
traditions) t~ promote a highly contentious scheme, 
regardless of our wishes?" 3 
Mr. Troup was prepared to accept almost any proposal 
which obviated the Dece ssi ty for intrusion on Hagley .Park.4 
1 A quantity surveyor 
2 A University lecturer 
3 'Star' 11th February 1963· 
4 12th February 1963~ 
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H. G. Royds in bis 'Press' article supplied an apparently 
plausible alte1native. He proposed a large roundabout 
at tbe Carlton Bridge Corner witb a capacity of 4,000 -
· 6,ooo Vebicles an bour, as a means of ironing out the 
bottleneck. A.n improved Park Terrace wou1d offer 
alternative approach rz)ut~s to tbe City Centre to 
relieve tbe Bealey Avenue intersections. 1 This proposal 
became Group policy in preference to an unlikely alter-
native subgested by Artbur Lusb in his 'Star' article. 
He envisaged a new route from the Fe:ndal ton Road railway 
crossing to tbe vicinity of the Salisbury Street/ 
Jiil h t St t . t' 2 ane es er ree Juno ion. 
H. G. Royds' general criticism of tbe motorway 
routes and tbe assumptions on whh.h tbey were based also 
went into Group policy. He questioned tbe Autb ori ty 1 s 
estimates of traffic growth. These were based on 
0 Amerioan practice" which he denied was applicable to 
New Zealand where the import of motor vehicles fluctuated 
with the level of the o-·uritry's overseas earnings. Mr. 
R'Jyds also argued that motorways are designed mainly 
to carry hea·7 private car v ·lumes at peak periods. 
1 Press 9 24th J':mur~.ry 1 963. 
2 
~~0 13th February 1963, 
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Eursuing tbis narr9w analysis of tbeir purpose be estim-
ated that in 1 980 less tban 1 % of the population would 
benefit from the motorways for only a few minutes each 
dtiy, 1 
Of less importance as a source of debating material 
was an examination of the r10torwn.y routes, th'e fourth 
article in tbe 'Press' series by G. L. Evans and Bill 
Lovell-Smitb.2 Tbey conceded tbat it would be bard to 
find less destructive alternatives to tbe tentative 
motorway r-rntes sbown in tbe Plan. But tbe article did 
question tbe necessity for tbe Fendalton-Avonside 
motorway on tbe basis of tbe Autb ori ty' s own traffic 
estimate s.3 Tbe Fendal ton-Avon side motorway is di sting-
ttistied from tbe Northern and Southern motorways by being 
a sbort section built into, and confined at eitber end, 
by low efficiency streets. Tbe se circumstances, tbe 
autb ors of the article argued, largely nullify the 
advantage of tbe mo~orway 1 s high efficiency. 
The exception among tbe eight signed articles was 
Mr. Tomlinson' s contribution to tbe 1J?ress 1 series, for 




'P.:,ess 1 24th January 1963. 
Professor Buchcmnn .j.n his 1966 repo-rt noted that 
the' 1rJ.otorwa,Y 11ms barely justified on 1980 figures 
vp1anning in Christchurch: A review' Colin 
Buchanan and-Partners. p.I}o -
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he implicitly rejected the basic assumption on which 
the J?lan is based - that provision must be made for the 
full use of the private car. Mr. Tomlinson saw the plan 
as a scheme to swamp the City Centre in a rapidly 
ioc-reasing vehicle population. Far from believing the 
estimates of traffic growth to be excessive he reckoned 
them to be conservative. His conclusion was that the 
Authority should plan a public transport system instead.
1 
The two most important articles which supplemented 
the real concerns of the Group as expressed by the two 
statements by the Gr1up as a whole, were by the architects 
P. J. Beaven and G. W. Lucking. Mr. Beaven, opening 
the 'Press t series, expressed the basic assumption of 
the Group with the statement that "the Plan as announced 
is a first stage traffic engineers functional analysis 
oni.y: 11 Be arguea tnat tne Pian tnreatened to oecurne 
an alien and destructive imposition on the City. This 
would be avoided if it were re-worked and properly 
assimilated into a comprehensive town plan. 
In the fourth article of the 'St~t~ series Mr. Lucking 
developed this ~rgument with a fresh emphasis.3 He 
1 'Pre SS' 31st January 1 963. 
? 'Press' ~2nd January 1 963. 
3 astar 0 14th February 1963. 
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argued that the Plan as it stood served merely as a 
frame on which an imaginative plan for the City 1 s 
development might by hung. Both Mr. Lucking and 
Mr. Beaver~ emphasised the danger of treating the Master 
Transportation Plan as an end in itself. Isolated as 
a plan designed merely to move traffic efficiently, not 
seriously disciplined by other considerations, such as 
the effect of its proposals on the human environment, 
the Plan promised to be excessively destructive for the 
achievement of its narrow purpose, 
In his article Mr. Lucking introduced the concept 
of precinct planning, 1 of the central area as the com-
plement to the Authority's motorway proposals. The 
precinct, Mr. Lucking emphasised, is essentially a 
pedestrian area. Tbe motcrways and their collector-
distributors bring bulk traffic only to the fringe of 
the proe1nct where parking buildings absorb it. Mr. 
Lucking envisaged a number of precincts grouped aroun' 
the central 'musiness precinct itself: a cultural 
precinct between the River and Rolleston Avenue, and a 
residential precilwt to the North East, In stead of a 
The term precinct is used here and in tb;-; debate 
generally in a loose sense to indicate an area from 
wbicb through traffic is excluded, The term 
properly refers to areas 11 of homogeneous use" 
around and between which - rut not within - the 
motors circulate". Colin Buchanan : Mt:x:edi 
Blessing; the Motor in Britain. p.166 
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mesh of streets all eoually subject to the conflict 
between pedestrians and vehicles, be proposed a special-
isation of function, with bulk traffic concentrated on 
specialist roads which enclosed areas given over to the 
. 1 
pedestrian. 
The final articles in each series, endoJ:mBd by the 
Group as a whole, perform two separate functions. 2 First, 
they detail the Group's real concern that the Plan might 
prove a dangerously narrow scheme having unnecessarily 
destr•ctive effects, especially in the central City. 
Secondly, these articles each set of which was accompanied 
by a sketch plan of the central area, put alternative 
mot0rway proposals to those of the Plan. The sketch 
plan puolished in the 'Press' on 15th February 1963 
eliminated the Fendal tr)n-Avonside motorway and upgraded 
Harper Avenue with a large roundabout at Carl ton Corner 
in its stead. It also :pushed the Northern motorway 
East o:n to the line of Fitzgerald Avenue and the Southern 
motorway was shown further South of the Railway Station 
to meet Mr. Beaven 1 s objection that, as sh own in the 
Plan, it strikes tbr ough the middle of the Sydenham 
1 
2 
N0te the similarity of these proposals with 
unpublished Authority material discussed in 
Chapter III. Mr. Lucking' s precinct proposals 
also anticipated Professor :Buchanan's environmental 
areas. 
Sto.v-- .9.ith ~bv-1..\alf'~ 
l"\b3 . 
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industrial district. Traffic would infiltrate the City 
from the motorway and the six lane ring road into which the 
three remaining avenues were converted. With the motorways 
·either outside, or running down the Belt in the case of 
Fitzgerald Avenue, the street pattern was radically reorg-
anised so that the existing continuous grid system was 
drastically reduced to a few collector roads. Many existing 
street connections were broken to create cul-de-saC' streets. 
The sketch map accompanying the last 0Star 0 article 
published on 27th February abandoned the separate routE'; of 
the Northern-Southern motorway and proposed instead the 
use of Moorhouse and Fitzgerald Avenues. The motorwn,ys 
would run down the centre of the two avenues on narrow pre-
stressed concrete columns, leaving the avenues to continue 
to perform their role as distributor roads. This radical 
proposal to re~site the motorways in their central city 
sections did not imply a wholesale rejection of the Plan 
by the Group. Despite apparent evidence to the contrary 
the Group was not vitally concerned about the siting of the 
motorways, the principle of which it approved. Having 
previously eliminated the Fendalton-Avonside motorway the 
Group now sought to increase the controversy provoking value 
\ts 
of tl1 itr Oplan ° by seeming to reject even the bacl{bone of 
the Plan, the Northern and South8rn motorways. 1 
1 A prominent Group member to1-cl the author that 811 




Tbe Group at tbis time was not primarily concerned 
witb tbe relative merits of alternative motorway ro-a:tes, 
but witb tbe problem of dealing witb tbe traffic coming 
.o:ff tbe motorways wherever tbey were sited. Tbe Group 
was ready to exploit public sentiment against any 
intrusion on Hagley Park, and they were equally prepared 
to dramatise tbeir differences with tbe Autbority by 
playing fast and 1 oose wi tb tbe remaining motorway 
proposals of tbe Plan. The Group wisbed to stimulate 
tbe maximum possible public debate wbicb would force 
not only a reconsideration and fre sb justification of 
the Plan's roading proposals but compel a full statement 
of precisely how tbe central City was to be planned in 
response to tbe radically new c ondi ti on s wbich would be 
created by tbe motorways. 
Tbe Group's real complaint against the Plan was 
tbat it did not complement its roading proposals with 
some s,ccount of bow the City Centre was to be planned. 
In their final 'Press' article the Group asked for a 
detailed stud~T of the acti vi ties in tbe City Centre and 
of how these might be planned under the new conditions 
which the motorways would create. The Group's 1 Star 1 
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article attempted a brief accouDt of bow traffic would 
use tbe motorways or ring roads to approacb a destination 
inside a precinct area. Since a direct route taken 
across one or more precincts would be very difficult, 
perbaps even impossible due to tbe drastic rearrangement 
•f tbe street system, most journeys would involve an 
oblique approacb by motorway or ring road before striking 
into tbe desired precinct. 
Commenting on tbe Group's proposals Mr. c. B. Millar, 
newly appointed Director of Planning at tbe Autbority, 
warned against tbe teo radical advocacy of arrangements 
favouring tbe pedestrian at tbe expense of tbe convenient 
movement of veb icle s. On tbe otber band be acknowledged 
1 
tbe timidity of tbe Plan in tbis respect. Tbe se 
geDeral comments on tbe Group articles typify Mr. Millar' s 
approach to tbe problem of dealing witb criticism. By 
minimising tbe differences between tbe Group's proposals 
and tb ose of tbe Plan and empbaa.ising tbe Group's 
approval of tbe principles of tlie Plan be sought to 
reduce tbe lev9l of controversy. Despite tbeir best 
efforts to inflate tbeir differenc'es witb tbe Autbority 
1 
'Pre S'S' 16th February 1963. 
90 
the Group 0 s investigations and proposals were represented 
as confirm8.tion of the soundness of the Plan. In an 
edi toris.l published on the eve of the first full consid-
eration of the Plan by the City Council the 0 :Pr.;;:~ss v 
too, minimised the differences between the Authority 
and the Group proposals. It said, 91 But the real 
lessons from the Grcup 0 s examination are that no easy 
solution of the traffic problems is possible.D 1 It 
implied that by toying with the Authority 0 s proposals 
the Group had actually advanced the cause of the Plan 
by demonstrating the near impossibility of discarding 
its essential features~ 
Despite the attempt to smother it in the embrace of the 
Authority the Group was a small and det'errninr:o:dly critical 
body which wanted the Master Transportation Plan modified 
or stopped. They did not advertise their membership 
(though the 0Star 0 reported on 27th February 1963 that 
the Group numbered fifteen) and did not welcome Mr. 
Millar 0 s suggestion, endorsed by the 0Press 0 , that they 
might broaden their membership and objectives to become 
a town planning association, They were informally 
1 
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organised and after tbis initial burst of activity the 
Group was reduced to an effective core of about five 
members led by lVIessrs. Beaven and Royds. The Group 
. cbose a narrow and essentially destructive role which 
tbey believed could be best performed by a body sucb as 
tbey then constituted. 
When the I:nsti tute ')f Engineers (Canterbury Branch) 
discussed the Plan on 25th lVIarch 1963, an informal 
debate between representatives (l)f the Autb ori ty and the 
Group developt;d. Each side revealed the strength and 
w~akriesses of its position in tbe contest for the Plan. 
The Auth·)rity was tied to its Plan proposals and could 
rmly reiterate and explain, and at most modify slightly 
in tbe face of criticism. The Group on the other band 
could offer blanket criticisms and seemingly plausible 
alternatives. Mr. Beaven argued tbat the Plan, by 
facilitatin 6 traffic flow, would create traffic conditions 
in tbl City Centre whicb would al ways out strip tbe mea:wure s 
designed to deal with them. lVIr. Royds offered the 
suggestion th'lt the problem of an inadequate street 
system could be overcome merely by spreading peak hour 
traffic. The costs of tbe Plan were repeated - 430 
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1 
bouses and 1,700 people moved. To avoid tbis and to 
spread peak b o-ar traffic Mr. Royds recommended faster 
traffic flow and better public transport. 
But tbe Authority held tbe initiative with its 
Published Outline wbicb tbe Group had tbe task of 
discrediting. It migtt be extremely difficult to 
refute critic ism convincingly but it was equally 
difficult to make criticism 'stick', especially the 
very general criticism offered by Messrs. Beaven and 
Royds. Tbe 3-roup having exploited the tactic of 
sweeping critic ism for maximum effect then found it 
impo~:ssible to sustain these criticisms in close argument. 
Meanwbile the Autb ori ty were modifying tbeir 
proposals so as to make tbemselves less vulnerable in 
debate. Tbey were ba-ving second tbougbts about tbe 
wisdom of treating tbe Fendal ton-Avonside motorway as 
if it were no more sibnificant than any otber part of 
tbe Flan. Tbe Autbority was now seeking some means of 
softening a proposal which bad appeared in tbe Outline 
Plan in a most provocative form. At tbe New Zealand 
Ge o-grapbical Society meeting Mr. Edmondson suggested that 
the motorway might parallel Harper Avenue from Fendal ton 
1 Group estimates 
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Road to tbe'elbow'and from tbere strike across tbe Park 
to Park Terrace. Commenting on this modification at 
tbe ItJ sti tute of Engineers panel discussion, Mr. Royds 
cl::J,imed tbat it would not be sufficient and tbat any 
intrusi·m wbatsoever would be resisted by popular 
opinLm. Having once -provoked sucb a violent reaction 
notbing sbort of tbe abandonment of tbe Park route would 
satisfy tbe objectors and the Authority was condemned 
to fight throughout aGainst a resistance which binged 
on the Park rvute protest. 
phapter V 
Modifications to the O~tlin~ 
the Debate Continues 
On Jlst March 1963, the period allowed for the 
submission of comments on the Plan to the Authority 
ended, and the debate went into recess while the 
Authority made fresh dispositions for the final contest. 
Editorial comment in both pap0rs1 marking the close of 
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the first round of the debate anticipated the Authority 0 s 
problem (or opportunity) of just how to recast its 
proposals in the light of criticism. 
The two papers argued from opposed premises. 
According to the 0Star 0 the Outline Plan published in 
September 1962 was a provisional plan designed to test 
public opinion. Therefore it followed that the eighty 
objections recfdved by the Authority on the subject of 
the Hagley Park route constituted sufficient evidence of 
public opinion to justify the re-siting of that section 
of the motorway. Objections to the passage of Madras 
St. through Latj_mer Squnre would be valid for the same 
reason. The following morning the 0Eress 0 carried on 
editorial which was c1early intended as a rebuttal~ It 
1 0~0 2nd April 1963, and 0Pross 0 Jrd April 19~~. 
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allowed the co11irnents received by the Authority to be of 
only very limited significance, merely that "the planners 
will have some information on the public 9 s reactions when 
they settle down to detailed work." 1 The editorial 
asserted that adverse comment on the Plan would necessarily 
be unrepresentative because the majority of the public 
would not be directly affected and therefore would 
express no opinion, Far from believing that the period 
allowed for comments was a period of democratic amendment 
the 9Press 9 believed the months of debate served to 
bring the objectors closer to the Pian proposals. This 
is a re-statement of the idea that debate, and even the 
persistence of objections, actually contribute to the 
eventual acceptance of the Plan by demonstrating its 
virtual inviolability to criticism. The editorial cited 
Councillor P. J, Skellerup as a persistent critic of the 
Plan who by that date (April 1963) had at least accepted 
the principle of the Plan by agreeing to the conversion 
of H8.rper Avenue into an eight lane highmay. 
In the event the Authority dealt with comment and 
criticism in a Report of some fifty foolscap pages. 2 
Mr. Bradshaw pointed out when he introduced the ReEort 
1 
2 
9 Press 9 Jrd April 1Cfb3 . 
Christchurch Regional Planning Authority: A 
.fumort on Comments Received. by the AuthoritYon 
the Christ£burch Ma_§_1er Trans~ortation Pla£ ~ 
hereafter referred to as the 9ReporJ:: on Com~.§l'.!.t.§. 9 
on Comments to tho Au th·or1 'by tw t al though the Authority 
had given full consideration to the objections of all 
interested parties it had a responsibility to the whole 
community to devise and press for what it considered to 
be the best solution. 1 
The Report on Comments must be read in conjunction 
with, and as a gloss on, the Outline Plan. As a 
supplement to the Outline the Re£or1 performed two 
general functions. Firstly it was an expansion on, 
and a defence of, those aspects of the Outline Plan 
which were questioned. Secondly it detailed certain 
modifications to the Outline and thus implicitly 
documented the grave shortcomings of the Outline as a 
basis for discussion. Indeed it represented a signifi-
cant extension of the Amthority 0 s intention when it 
adopted the Plan in principle and submitted it to its 
constituent Councils 11as a basis for discussion 11 • 2 
For up to this time the possibility that the public 
might become an effective influence on the planning process 
had not been seriously considered by the Authority and 




2 0~g0 report of the Authority meeting adopting 
the Outline Plan. 5th September~ 1962. 
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The Report on ComTI}.fillt§. attempts a fresh justific-
ation of the concept of the Plan in response to a series 
of comments on the Plan 9 s assumptions by the City 
Planning Study Group, The Group Offered two separate 
comments on the attempt to plan for increasing numbers 
of private cars. In the first place it regarded the 
1980 estimate of vehicle registrations as excessive, 
arguing that the country 0 s fluctuating export earnings 
would not permit the purchase of vehicles in such numbers. 
In answer the Report argued that the Outline Plan 9 s 
estimate of a 4% yearly increase in vehicle numbers was 
a yearly average increase which had already been exceeded 
on critical parts of the road network. 1 
Secondly, the Group considered that the Outline 
Plan instead of planning facilities primarily for the 
use of private cars might have planned to divert the 
increasing numbers of car owners to public transport 
services for journeys to and from the City Centre, The 
~port considered two possible methods of achieving this 
both of which it rejected. It considered that 
restrictions on the entry of cars into the City Centre 
as a means of diverting their occupants to public trans-
1Between 1959 and 19.63 a growth rate of 6% per annum 
was recorded on the radials approaching the belts, 
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port would be more likely to result in the transfer of 
much central area activity to the suburbs. Alternatively, 
any attempt to solve the traffic problem by offering 
an improved public transport system as a freely chosen 
option could not be relied upon to achieve its object, 
A suggestion from another correspondent for free public 
transport1 was considered to involve vastt expenditure 
without any certainty that it would induce the majority 
of car owners to switch to public transport. And to 
free 1964 bus travel of any charge would not have been 
enough to make it a competitive option. An extension 
of routes and a much greater frequency of service would 
be required. According to the Report: 11 All the major 
works contemplated in the Master Transportation Plan 
would be necessary for the efficient movement of a 
largrer transport fleet, 11 The ReRort concluded that the 
annual cost of such an improved service was i 11ikely to 
be at least equal if not greater than the annual cost of 
the major works of the Master Transportation Plan," 2 
These arguments for the practical necessity of planning 
a road network for increasing numbers of private cars 
make explicit what was largely taken for granted in the 
1 Dealt with elsewhere in the Report at p-.38 
2 Report on Commen.i§. p.39 
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published Outline which merely noted that1 "From trends 
over the last twenty years it is expected that, in the 
next twenty years, public passenger transport will not 
be able to make any additional contribution in the 
transport scene and, relatively, could lose ground, 111 
A notable f~ilure of the Ji_eporj;:, however, was its 
inadequate reply to the Study Group 0 s expression of 
serious misgivings about the future of the City Centre. 
The Report disclaimed any responsibility for the detailed 
planning of the central City, It stated that this would 
be a task for the City Council at a later stage. Never-
theless this detailed planning problem was claimed to have 
been kept in mind throughout the preparation of the 
OUtline Plan. The Report stated that the function of a 
motorway serving a eity eentre is "to discharge vehicles 
as close as possible to their destination having regard 
to distribution and dispersal within the area concerned. 112 
The Repori asserted that the motorways bringing traffic 
) to the fringes of the City centre are designed to be 
complemented by precinct planning. The Report commented 
that sketch maps by the Study Group of the central City 
area, showing a radical reorganisation of the street 
l vcaristchurch Master Transportation Plan, 0 p.11 
2 Report sn Comments p.J2 
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system, might be too drastic, If many streets were 
closed those remaining open would have to be widened, 
However, the Authority failed in not producing a 
tentative plan for the City centre, perhaps in conjunction 
with City Council technical staff. Very general verbal 
reassurances were not enough to overcome the fears of 
the Study Group. 
The Report argued that not only is the siting of 
the motorways close to the City centre compatible with 
precinct development but is essential if the purpose 
for which the motorways are designed is not be be 
nullified, High efficiency motorwe,ys sited on the 
Belts and linked with the City centre by low efficiency 
streets would be of little value. The Report rejected 
the Group 0 s suggestion that the motorways as sited in 
the Outline Plan would crowd the City centre and allow too 
little :room for development. It argued that central 
City areas do not expand horizontally in direct relation-
ship to population growth and insisted that there is more 
than adequate room for development inside the motorways, 
The Report also dismissed the Group 0 s cri ticis:m that the 
Fendalton-Avonside motorw2y bisects a potential high 
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density residential area, by pointing out that in fact 
the motorway would for most of its length mark the edge 
of the residential area. 
The Eeport rejected, for tebhnical reasons, the 
Group 0 s suggestion that the motorways should run on the 
Belts, It argued that the Belts and the motorways 
superimposed on them would not be capable of carrying the 
through and turning traff-ic estimated for 1980. Unf ort-
una tely the Report did not make it clear why this should 
be the case though it seemed to indicate that the motor-
way traffic would have to be distributed from the Belts 
and that it is here that critical overloading would 
occur. 
Having listed its objections and comments in its 
submission to the Authority, the Group threw in as an 
extra its opinion that immediate adoption of the Plan 
was not necessary given present traffic conditions. In 
reply the Report argued that the Plan should be adopted 
as soon as possible so that qouncils could control 
development which would otherwise conflict with the 
Pli:.m, Early agreement would also permit early con-
struction before traffic conditions became intolerable. 
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It maintainr::-d that there was no necessity for delay on the 
grounds that the Plan was not a properly integrated com-
ponent of a comprehensive town plan, It asserted that 
these wider considerations, such as the effect of traffic 
on environment, were kept under review throughout the 
development of the Plan, 
The Report ~ments formally registered two 
significant modifications to the Outline Plan. It 
modified the Durham Street distributor to accommodate 
the Town Hall site. More important, the R~port system-
atically worked out for the first time the argument for 
the Fendalton-Avonside motorway, an argument which had 
appeared only in short point form in the Outline Plan. 
By reviewing the present and future traffic pattern to 
the West of the City centre the Reporl put a convincing 
case for a motorway from the end of Fendalton Road to 
Salisbury Street and beyond. It demonstrated that the 
problem of overloaded intersections at Carlton Mill 
Bridge and Papanui Road/BeaJ.ey Avenue necessitated a 
second East-West route for access to the Northern City 
centre. Drawing traffic not only from Fendalton Road but 
also from Blenheim Road and Riccarton Road the motorway 
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would relieve Bealey Avenue of all that traffic now 
passing onto it at the critical Ca.rlton Mill intersection. 
The Repor1 went on to discuss possible variations 
of that part of the Fendalton-Avonside motorway which 
appeared as a straight line across North Hagley Park in 
the Outline Plan. The Report acknowJe~ed the Authority's 
error in showing the motorway in this form without comment 
and without emphasising that the line merely indicated a 
need for a first class road in the vicinity, In 
discussion at the Authority on how best to present this 
section of the motorway in the revised Plan, Mr, C, B. Millar 
argued that it ought to be indicated without any connection 
between Fendalton Road and Park Terrace, leaving the City 
Council to ma1rn good the omission at the detailed design 
stage, 1 This recommendation was not taken up but the 
Report on Comments did seem to offer alternatives. 
Detailed studies following the publication of the Outline 
in 1962 had revealed that Harper Avenue would not be 
required in addition to the motor~ay, Accordingly, the 
Report suggested either that Harper Avenue should be 
returned to the Park and the motorway built on a direct 
line as shown in the Outline or, that the motorway be 
1 Interview, 
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built on the line of Harper Avenue as far as the 9elbow 9 
from where it would strike across the Northern corner of 
the Park, Maps subsequently published by the Authority 
adopted the second alternative. 
In the concluding section of the Report which takes 
the form of a cost-benefit analysis of the Plan, it was 
stated that the Plan 11 may not be ideal but it is a 
balanced and co-ordinated Planmc.tched to the future needs 
of Christchurch. ~11 The Report argued that tho Plan 1 s 
real value to the City would be immeasurable for it pro-
poses the means to mak0 access to the City centre possible 
when it would otherwise be impossible. If constructed 
as planned within th~ twenty year period it would check 
on otherwise inevitable tendency to costly decentralis-
a ti on, The Report compared, in some detail, the benefits 
. 
of long term planning with the benefits of a policy of 
isolated responses to obvious needs, By arguing that 
such a policy of piecemeal solutions might only have the 
effect of transferring a difficulty from one point to 
anothsr, it made long term planning appeer not an alter-
native lJut a necessity, Seen in this light the comparison 
of estim2'ted costs is merely a demonstration piece, At 
1 ReR,ort on Conmien ts p.40 
a cost of £6 million more over the twenty year period 
(the difference bc:oiween £4.3 million and £37 million at 
1962/63 prices) the Plan is guaranteed to return a 
predictable and desired result as against an unknown 
but almost certainly inadequate street system at the 
end of the same period, 
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In an editorial on the morning following the adoption 
of the Report on Comments (8th April, 1964) the aPress' 
welcomed the ro-i:rnrking of the argument for the Plan, By 
re-testing some of its data and arguing its assumptions 
and proposals afresh, it seemed that the Authority was 
neutralising opposition to its Plan by slowly eroding 
grounds for resistance. Yet it was failing to deal with 
the key issue raised by its critics, By insisting that 
the Plan was merely an outline transportation plan and 
refusing to offer even a tentative scheme of City centre 
arrangements, the Authority failed to come to grips with 
the political problem facing it, The Authority failed 
to isolate this vital area of disagreement or misunder-
standing between itself and the Study Group and then to 
set about the business Of eliminating. it, It was quite 
true that the City Council would ultimately be responsible 
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for the design of the City centre but if concern for 
this question was a major obstacle to acceptance of the 
Plan it ought to have been faced and dealt with. The 
Authority seems not to have been fully aware of the polit-
ical nature of the problem, ~he existence of an 
opposition Group claiming technical authority was 
virtually the pre-condition for effective opposition to 
the Plan in the City Council - it supplied the technical 
criticisms and alternatives. The Authority failed to 
make an adequate attempt to diminish the Group 9s very 
real misgivings and th~refore their opposition to the Plan. 
In an article under Mr. Beaven°s name published 
in the e~o on 4th May, 196~,, the Group gave notice 
that the ReRort on Comment£ had in no way satisfied them. 1 
Miss Northcroft who was now in private practice in the 
City, volunteered a reply to this article but it was 
declined by Mr. Burns the Editor of the 9§.:!ill.r. 9 as 
unsuitable to appear on the Leader page because of its 
partisan nature. Rather than have it relegated to a less 
conspicuous space where it would not be read, Miss 
Northcroft re-cast it in a form which omitted any mention 
of Mr. Beaven°s article, A major point of the article 
1 
T~is article is notable for the way in which the 
Authority 0 s cost estimates were misrepresented. 
It was asserted that the Authority intended to spend 
in a twenty year period £46million (probably more) on 
elevated concrete motorways in the metropolitan area. 
In fact the motorway component of the Plan was est-
imated at £20million, Report on Comments, p,44 
The £46million figure was the estimated cost of all 
roading expenditure in a twenty year period, 
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was that the Outline Plan was designed with 11 the motor-
ways and other major routes located to facilitate the 
development of precincts°' but that these arrangements 
were not shown because their design awaited the detailed 
planning stage. 1 
This assurance became more inadequate when the Study 
Group secured a copy of the Buchanan Report, 2 This Report 
sets out to investigate the impact of incr~asing numbers 
of vehicles on urban areas and seeks the basis of an 
arrangement of access and facilities which would permit 
the use of large numbers of vehicles, while at the same 
time preserving adequate living conditions in towns. 
Mr. H. G. Royds has acknowledged that not until the 
Buchanan Report became available did the Group have the 
material for an authoritatiye critique of the Plan. 
According to Mr.· Royds the Group had alwa3rs known that 
the Plan was unsatisfactory because it 11 a11ow ed. traffic 
to dominate" but that it was Prof, Buchanan°s exposition 
of the conflict between accessibility and environment -
between the vehicles and the facilities they serv~d -
which enabled the Group to fully appreciate and therefore 
more effectively combat a Plan which it believed sacrificed 
l 0star 0 21st May 1964. 
2 The Report of a working Group appointed by the United 
Kingdom Minister of Transport in 196.1 and published 
by H.~·~.s.o. in 1963 under the title .. 0Traffic in 
Towns 0 • It is commonly known as the Buchanan 
Report after c.D~ Buchanan who led the Working Group. 
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environment to accessibility. 1 
In a letter published in article form by the 9Star 9 
on 2 ?th May 1961+, the Group argued that the Plan had been 
rendered outof date by the Buchanan Report. The Group 
noted that the basic assumption of the Report is that in 
the conflict between tt:raffic and facilities (or environ-
ment) the environmental standards chosen for any area 
will determine the amount and type of traffic it can 
accommodate. The statement went on to say that 11 it may 
be that a proper study on the lines of the Buchanan Report 
would show that our six lane Be]_ts are capable, with 
improv,ements, to handle all the traffic which it is 
desirable to bring into the City,« 2 
This was almost certainly the most significant and 
valid criticism ever brought against the Master Transport-
ation Plan. In the light of the convincing analysis 
of the Buchanan Report it is not enough that the motorways 
and other major routes of the Plan should have been planned 
with smmething like the network and environmental area 
concept in mind. The Buchanan Report argues that v1in 
most cases the network would be designed to suit the 
capacity of the (~nvironmental) areas just as a water pipe 
1 
2 
Mr. H. G. Royds in a letter to Councillor 
P.J. Skellerup dated 25th February, 1966. 
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is designed to s'uit the cistern it serves. 191 Merely 
to .Pla.n a network within which a number of environmental 
areas are assumed is to leave the fundamental objective 
of environmental conditions to chance, In terms of 
Professor Buchcina.n's (\nQlysis th~ plannin5 of the environ .... 
mental areas, and the application of environmental 
standards to them, cannot wait to the detailed design stage 
but must necessarily be the first step in the planning 
process. 
In an editorial on 20th June 1964, the 0Press 0 in 
a discussion of the Buchanan Report claimed that Q0exactly 
the same principles were applied in Christchurch as in the 
2 study of several English urban areas. vo In a letter to 
the 0Press 0 on 2·4th June the Group disagreed stating that 
0 TI;e Christchurch Plan differs because it pre-supposes 
the full use of the car in the central area without any 
assessment of its effect on environment", In a wholly 
unconvincing editorial reply the 0PressQ failed to deal 
with this crucial point of the reversal of the traffic 
planning process, It quite erroneously claimed that 
11 the basic standpoint of their study (the Buchanan Report) 
.was to see how the best use of motor vehicles could be 
1 
2 
Traffic in Towns p.42 
Presumably the editorial refers to the 91 practical 
studies 01 of the Buchanan Report. 
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achieved and how present traffic difficulties could be 
1 overcome. 11 Certainly the Buchanan Report seeks to 
provide for the best use of motor vehicles but with the 
vital qualific@tion that the number and type of vehicles 
deh:.~'f'M:()ed 
using an environmental area will always be ft; t !!!ml by 
the 11 environmental capaci ty 11 of the area as distinct 
from its 11 crude capaci ty~1 • 2 On the other hand the 
Report makes it clear that though an environmental area 
has a definable environmental capacity as it stands, 
the environmental uapacity can be increased by the 
re-arrangement of buildings and access ways. 
The Authority did not reply to this fundamental 
criticism of its method because it was not pressed to 
do so. The Study Group only stated the deficiency of 
the Plan as a scheme to facilitate traffic movement in 
general terms ~ithout emphasising the complete reversal 
in method in the design of a road network, advocated by 
the Buchanan Report. 
Throughout the middle months of 1964 the amended 
Outline Plan was being considered by various City Council 
Committees in preparation for the critical meeting of 
the full Council required to give or withhold its 
1 gPress v 24th June l<lb4 · 
2 tTraffic in Towns' p.50 
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specific approval of the Plan. As part of its 
campaign to influence this decision the Group organised 
on Saturday, 11th July, a public forum chaired by the 
·Deputy-Mayor Mr. H. P. Smith. On the previous day the 
o~o carried a statement by the Group inviting the 
public to use the opportunity to decide on those aspects 
of the City 9 s environment which ought to be considered 
in the preparation of any traffic plane 
The 0Press 0 reported that at times there were 150 
people at the public forum but a correspondent of that 
paper who did not sympathise with the critical purpose 
of the meeting, characterised it as having an 11 emotionally 
charged atmosphere" and declared it to be dominated by 
~the Fendalton element". 1 A demonstration motion 
protesting any infringement of Hagley P8 rk was carried 
without dissent. Mr. Gordon Troup proposed that the 
principle of limiting central area traffic as the only 
sure method of preserving an adequate environment, should 
be endorsed by the meeting. A discussion on the ~se of 
the Belts to carry the motorways revealed a significant 
difference of opinion. Mr, F, M. Warren a Christchurch 
architect argued that far from cramping the City centre 
as some speakers suggested, the motorways as shown on the 
1 Observer in the 0Press 0 
official Plan would allow more than adequate room for 
development. 1 
At a second forum on Saturday, 22nd August, a 
project (already approved by the City Council) for a 
bridge linking Antigua Street with Rolleston Avenue, 
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·was discussed. The meeting, with only two dissenting, 
asked the Council to reconsider its decision. 2 The 
Group had already, on 5th August, sent a deputation to 
the City Council Works Committee protesting against the 
proposal and had been asked to supply an alternative. 
This was done and the alternative plan of the area, drawn 
by H. A. Montgomery, a university lecturer] was published 
on the eve of the second forum. In the accompanying 
article Mr. Montgomery acknowledged the validity of the 
purpose of the Antigua Street/Rolleston Avenue route, 
stated in a report issued by the City Engineer on 24th 
September to be, to 91 provide an al terna ti ve distributing 
route to the City centre from the South."4 As an 
alternative to the use of Rolleston Avenue the Group 
~~;p;0sed the use of Montreal Street, which bisects the 
so-called river precinct between the Botanic ca.rden•s and 





'Press' 1 Jth July tctbk. . 
'Press' 24th August l<:'\'=>lt. 
M.r. Montgomery a prominent member of the Group from 
mid 1963 onwards was principally interested in this 
aspect of the Plan. 
The route was shown on the 19'52 Outline Plan without 
comment. 
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of Rolleston Avenue was that the heavy traffic flow it 
would carry would be imcompatible with the Avenue 9 s 
primary function as a means of access to the Museum, the 
Botanic Gardens, Christ 9 s College and the University. 
Knowing that they could not sustain a case against the 
claimed need for a 91 distributing route" the Group offered 
as an alternative Montreal Street, the very road which if 
developed as suggested would have severed an area generally 
considered as a unit, 1 In this case the Group offered an 
alternative more destructive than the proposal it rejected 
not because it preferred one to the other for some peculiar 
reason but because it was prepared to offer an alternative, 
any alternative which would gain time and force a recon-
2 sideration of the problem. 
By early September some supporters of Plan feared 
for 1 ts future. Newspaper correspondence, the only 
indication of public opinion, was running heavily against 
the Plan. An important function of the first forum was 
to provoke a fresh spate of letters to both newspapers. 
Between the middle of July and the end of December 1964 
over 140 letters in both papers discussed the Plan on a 
much wider front than .those which were overwhelmingly 
1 
2 
The City Engineer's report of 24th September 
rejected Montreal Street for this reason. 
Interview. 
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concerned with the intrusion on Hagley Park when the Plan 
was published in 1962. On 12th October the 0Press', in 
an attempt to stop the rot, introduced the first of a series 
of seven articles which would, it hoped, "help to guide 
the public to a proper understanding of the subject." 
These articles were solicited "in the belief that ••• the 
great majority of our responsible and thoughtful citizens 
- recognise the Master Transportation Plan to be in its 
main essentials both necessary and well-considered." 
In a letter to Gordon Tait one of the contributors to 
the series, Mr, A. R. Cant editor of the 'Press 0 was 
rather more explicit. There was, he said, "now a very 
real danger of the Plan°s being rejected by the City 
Council and perhaps of its eventually being abendoned, 111 
These articles represent a belated effort by supporters 
of the Plan outside the Regional Planning Authority, to 
do what the Authority could not do for itself - win 
public confidence in its competence and in its proposals. 
Th'e 9Press' provided contributors with clerical and 
journalistic help while the ~uthority provided factual 
and diagrammatic ~aterial. No contributor advanced any 
significant new argument in favour of the Plan. Their 
1 Letter dated 10th September 1964. 
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task, in the words of the Editor, was merely "for some 
responsible people to say that the planners are not acting 
irresponsi bly 11 ,,1 Three university professors 
(R. J, Rastrick, John Simpson and A. J. Danks); two 
architects (Paul Pascoe and F. M. Warren); and two well-
known businessmen (R. H, Ballantyne and Gordon Tait) 
carried the requisite authority for that task and under 
them names most of the familiar arguments for the Plan 
were rehearsed. The City Planning Study Group approached 
Mr, Cant with the offer· of a series of articles in reply. 
They were refused on the ground that they 11 had had their 
say91 • 2 
The final article in the series by the architect 
F~ M. Warren whilst approving the Plan, recalled the 
circumstances in which the Authority was required at 
short notice to draw together its work up to mid-1962 to 
publish a Plan. He suggested ~t 0plan' was a mislead-
ing word to desc-ribe what was in fact only 11 a diagram 
illustrati~ the basic conception11 3 and that the Authority 
had been handicapped thereafter defending this basic 
diagram which the public treated as a finished plan. 
When the public demanded details of routes and the form 
1 Ibid, 
2 Interview 
3 0Press' 28th October #'lk-1+. 
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of motorways they were told that such things could not 
be determined till the detailed design stage. Elsewhere1 
Mr, Warren has argued that the failure of the Authority 
to offer what he called "creative possibilities" left the 
bald proposals of the Outline Plan to appear negative 
and destructive. In his 0Press 0 article he condeded 
that such a task was beyond the resources of the Authority 
with their tiny staff and small budget.. 
As the q£]'ess 0 pointed out when it commented on 
the comparative failure of the Authority 0 s public 
relations, the City Council was in a certain sense to 
2 blame. It had left the Authority too long performing 
a task for which it was not equipped, Under-staffed 
and working on other projects it did not have the time 
to devote to arguing for the Plan, Indeed, such a complex 
and demanding responsibility could never have been 
envisaged for it. Until mid-1962 the Authority had 
worked on the unquestioned assumption that the Plan it 
was preparing would not be revealed until it had reached 
the detailed design stage by which time the Authority 0 8" 
constituent Council_s would have been long committed 'ID i tit 
The decision to publish a half finished plan at short 
1 0Town Planning guarterly 0 June 196.S. 
2 'Press 0 28th October 1964. 
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notice involved the Authority in a novel exer·ci,se for 
which it was totally unprepared. It prejudiced its 
task from the outset by showing the Fendalton-Avonside 
motorway as a blatant straight line across North Hagley 
Park, -a self-inflicted handicap the serious effects of 
which it was never able to overcome. 
CHAPTER VI 
The City Council and The Planf 
September 1962 -::_December 1964 
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The Regional Planning Authority sought approval for 
·the Master Transportation Plan' from all si~ of its con-
' 
stituent Councils. The granting of this approval was 
not especially difficult for the five outlying Councils. 
Two (Riccarton and Heathcote) were not directly affected 
by the motorway proposals. However, the Southern motor-
way passes through the North corner ofHalswell County and 
on into Paparua County to meet the Main South Road beyond 
Templeton, From the Waiillakariri River to the City 
boundary the Northern motorway runs through Waimari 
County. Yet from the beginning the only decision of any 
significance was that to be made by the overwhelmingly 
preponderant local body, the City Council. 
As a political problem the Master Transportation Plan 
was to some extent typical of the problems of City Council 
development projects, representing a cost on Counc~l income 
and affecting existing interests. However, it was 
distinguished by being unusually extensive and disruptive. 
Local body politics in Christchurch are characterised by a 
comparatively intim8te relationship between electors and 
elected.
1 
This factor coupled with the Plan's other 
1 See G. Cheyne °Christchurch - The Men Who Govern' 
p.43 
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chnractoristics meant that it was a peculiarly difficult 
problom for City Councillors. Little wonder thnt the 
City Council wns 91 shockod 911 when the Plan was published 
in September 1962, 
Because the City Council never gained the political 
confidence necessary to deal with the Plan decisively, 
the process of decision was hesitant, piee~meal and 
repetitive. It required, but dtdnot always get, the 
exercise of patience and tact by the Regional Planning 
Authority and the skilful advocacy of the Plan by two 
successive City Engineers, to coax the City Council to 
sanction the Plan in stages. As the major group in the 
City Council the Citizens 0 Association had to assume this 
invidious responsibility and continuing political 
embarrassment. Its attitude is indicated by its 1965 
Local Body Election manifesto. Policy under the heading 
of roading began:' "The City Council is required by lnw to 
have a Master Transportation Flem. 11 Thus the problem of 
the Master Transportation Plan was not a problem of 
political choice despite a widely held assumption to the 
contrary, It was a problem of familiarisation and 
adjustment in which the City Council cautiously led its 
1 Councillor H. P. Smith 
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electorate, 
Mr. c. B, Millar, currently Director of Planning 
at the Regionnl Planning Authority, h,c:i,s said that it is 
not essential that local body members fully understand 
the procedure or intentions of a plan but that they must 
know the consequences of rejecting it, 1 City Council 
treatment of the Plan does something to demonstrate the 
truth of this statement. The Council could and did 
delay decision, and compel modifications in detail, but 
it could never have rejected the Plangs principal 
recommendations. The Ol...tline Plan demonstrated a need 
and )2rcposed a solution. No viable alternative was ever 
suggested outside the Regional Planning Authority. 
After the Authority revealed the Plan on 10th September 
1962, constituent Councils had little choice but to make 
the best of it. 
The first step towards City Council approval of the 
Plan was taken on 26th November 1962 when the Covncil 
adopted a recommendation of its Town Planning Committee 
that the Regional Planning Authority should continue 
with detailed work on the Plan. This implied approval 
in principle was, however, formally ratified by a special 
1 Address to the Christchurch Civic Trust, 
14th December, 1966~ 
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meeting of the City Council on 20th February 196,3. 
J.'.1r. Bradshaw, who spoke to the Council on that occasion, 
made it clear that all the Authority required at that 
stage was approval in principle. He asked the Council 
to consider the Plan as a whole and to give its assent 
to the general concept of the Plan, especially the 
principle of the.motorway system. He argued that 
details of the Plan, notably the line of the motorway \1 
across the Park, were not at issue. However, Mr. 
Bradshaw did of~er some slight reassurance on this point 
when he commented that the Authority was now considering 
the possibility of using Harper Avenue as part of the 
motorway route. 1 
Not only was the approval required of the Council 
very general but the Council was encouraged to give its 
approval by the City Engineer, Mr. Somers2 • In his 
report to the Council Mr. Somers put a restrained but 
persuasive case for the concept of the Plan, Like 
J.'.1r. Bradshaw he emphasised that comment would be appropriate 
on the principles only, 1v1r. Somers emphasised his long 
connection with the Plan during its development. Yet 
1 
2 
0Press 0 21st February 1963. 
Council consideration of the Plan coincided with the 
retirement of Mr, Somers and it was suggested to the 
author that on this sentimental occasion the Plan 
was approved out of deference to him. This 
0 explanation° is, however. superfluous. 
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he maintained a critical independence, suggesting for 
instance, that if the Park motorway proved unavoidable 
it might run parallel with both Harper Avenue and Park 
Terrace so as to avoid actual severance of the Park. 
In his defence of the Plan Mr. Somers rejected the 
suggestion that it was a 0 traffic only' plan and he 
declared that he believed its reading proposals to have 
been developed in the context of a broad estimate of 
the Cityvs development. His report recommended motor-
ways as such for reasons of traffic efficiency, safety 
and economics. On the question of the Fendalton-Avonside 
motorway the report considered and rejected the Bealey 
Avenue alternative. 1 
The City Council implied its approval when it 
adopted the City Engineervs report but by merely adopting 
the report without discussing its principal recommendations 
the Council plunged passed the fundamentals to the details. 
Though urged by Mr. Somers to consider the basic concept 
of the Plan the Council did not do so~ Preoccupied with 
the threat to Hagley Park the Council did not consider the 
question of whether a system of motorways such as the Plan 
proposed was appropriate or ~cceptable. Instead the 
1 City Council Minute Book No. I February - June 1963 
p.52112 . 
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Council anticipated the problem of the alignment of the 
Fendalton-Avonside motorway; a problem properly reserved 
for a later stage. Some Councillors realised that the 
concession of approval in principle might prejudice their 
ability to prevent any intrusion on Hagley Park. 
Councillor R. M. Macfarlane (Labour) expressed misgivings 
at the request for approval not because he .disapproved 
the concept of the Plan but because he feared that 
approval in principle might mean that the Park route 
would eventually be sanctioned when all possible alter-
natives were discarded. No eouncillor seriously 
questioned the principle of a system of motorways 
superimposed on the street system of the City, Yet 
having once conceded this principle argument about the 
details was prejudiced by the technical demands of the 
efficient functioning of the motorway system as a whole, 
During the debate a division of emphasis on the 
principal 0detail 9 , the Fendalton-Avonside motorway, did 
appear which was later to prove the basis for a party 
division in the Council, Councillors Macfarlane, 
Pickering, Armstrong, Denton and Howard (all Labour) and 
Councillor Skellerup (Citizensv) made it clear that they 
would never sanction any intrusion on the Park, 
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Councillor Hay was representative of more flexible 
Council opinion when he indicated that while he greatly 
preferred that the motorway not infringe the Park, if this 
should be shown to be unavoidable he would not object to 
a properly landscaped road. 1 
In the majn the Council merely adopted the City 
Engineer 9 s recommendations, putting them in the form of 
requests to the Regional Planning Authority. It asked 
the Authority to reconsider the Plan as it affected Hagley 
Park, This motion was put by Councillor R. M. Macfarlane 
and accepted without dissRnt. In addition the Council 
asked that City Council co-operation be sought when the 
time came top lan the one-way street system directly 
associated with the motorways. A detailed economic 
appraisal of the Plan as it was further developed was 
also called for. Finally, the Council recommended to 
the Authority, the report submitted to it by the Study 
Group. 
Nearly fourteen months later on 7th April 1964, the 
Regional Planning Authority gave notice that the process 
of ratification might be continued when it ad.opted the 
fieport on Comments received by the Autho.rJ.t.x on the 
1 qPressQ 21st February 1963. 
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th~ Master Transport~ion Plan. In a letter dated 17th 
April the Authority invited the City Council to approve 
the amended Outline Plan. The Authority had 0 softened 0 
the intrusion on Hagley Park as much as possible and now 
awaited the City Council 0 s response. However, 0 final 
terms 0 offered by the Authority only minimised the 
intrusion on the Park and so this objection remained the 
ccrne rs tone of opposition to the Plan, Nothing less than 
the complete abandonment of the route across the Park 
would have satisfied the objectors, This objection 
also acted as the tangible focus of a whole range of 
rather vague misgivings about the implications of the 
Plan for the City. These much wider fears were given a 
powerful stimulus by the introduction, at the end of May, 
' 
of the Buchanan Report into the debate, By insisting that 
the Buchanan Report had rendered the Plan a dated concept 
the Study Group increased the pressures for a full 
reconsideration, Yet the preoccupation with the Park 
route tended to overshadow other issues, Paradoxically, 
the Hagley Park protest as the heart of popular opposition 
to the Plan-diverted attention from more fundamental 
complaints against it, 
It was with this increasingly confused debate as a 
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background that City Council consideration of the Plan 
resumed in mid-1964. From April until the end of 
November it went on behind closed doors in committee. 
The process was leisurely, perhaps unnecessarily so. 
The amended Plan passed in turn from the Town Planning 
Committee to the Traffic, Reserves, Works and Finance 
Committees. 1 
At a meeting of the Council on 20th May 1964 the 
Reserves, Traffic, Works and Town Planning. Committees 
reported on their attitude to the amended Plan, No 
Committee with the possible exception of Traffic was 
seeking a formula which the full Council could take up 
to endorse the Plan, The Traffic Committee report 
accepted the argument for the Park route but qualified 
its acceptance with a recommendation that the proposal 
be further investigated, Following the lead of the Town 
Planning Committee it asked for a special meeting of the 
Council to discuss the Plan. The Works Committee merely 
acknowledged that it had studied the amended Plan. 
Only one Committee avoided this reluctance to commit 
itself to an unqualified statement of approval or dis-
approval, In its report to the Council on 20th May the 
1 It was suggested to the author that the process 
might have been speeded up if either the Town 
Planning or Traffic Committees had retained respons-
ibility for Committee consideration and had merely 
asked other Committees for their opinion on aspects 
relevant to their fields, Instead, the amended Plan 
passed from one Committee to another, each defining 
its interest and responsibility as it saw fit, When 
it is considered that each Councillor sat on at 
least two of these Committees the procedure seems 
particularly futile. 
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Reserves Committee said that it was still "completely 
opposed to any intrusion into Hagley Park. 091 • 2 
The Reserves Committee delivered a full report to 
the Council on the 20th July. It called the Fendalton-
A''lronside motorway in either of its alternative forms the 
"most vigorous and determined attempt (to encr c:ach on 
Hagley.Park) ever contemplated in the history of 
Christchurch. 0 3 The report detailed its estimate of 
the destruction which the route would cause - the loss 
of no less than twelve acres of parkland and 200 trees. 
To avoid this the report suggested the full use of the 
Lr 
Belts "even to the expense of say 10% of the scheme." 
This su~gestion entailed the upgrading of Harper Avenue 
into a six lane highway and a second bridge at Carlton 
Mill Corner. 
This report 'was a new and dangerous threat to the Plan. 
It was a defiant challenge to one aspect but it also 
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In 1964 the Reserve~ Committee was chaired by 
Councillor P. u. Skellerup probably the best known 
opponent of the Park route. In addition six of 
the eight remaining members were opponents of the 
route or of the Plan as a whole1 Councillors 
R. G, Brown, M. E. McLean, W, E. Olds (Citizens 0 ) 
R. H. Stillwell, H. E. Denton, and M, B, Howard 
(Labour), Councillors A. Schumacher and W.P. Glue 
(Citizens 0 ) were not known opponents of the Plan, 




Belts, Most ominously the Reserves Committee report 
represen.too the determined opinion of a group :from both 
sides of the Council table, The Committee stated I 11 We 
are determined_ the resist, at all costs, and with all our 
power, enc rCBchment, for any purpose, by any body of 
people, on this, the mnin breathing space in the whole 
City. 111 The report quoted a remark which it alleged 
hod been made by a senior Regional Planning Authority 
2 officer to the Deputy ChEd_rman of the Reserves Committee 
at the City Council meeting of 20th February 1963. This 
officer was quot,ed as saylng1 "No matter what you say, 
what the City Council says or what the public of 
Christ church says, the road will J£O tb,rough the Park. n 3 
This provocative statement was now used to justify an 
equally uncompromising opposition. Such militant 
opposition was precisely what the Regional Planning 
Authority could not afford and need n~ver have 
encouraged, On the whole the Authority understood its 
task of gentle persuasion and performed it well, It 
was a serious blunder to provide critics of the Plan 
with the stimulus of a keen sense of an overbearing 
opponent. However, it was an isolated incident, In 
1. u~o 21st July \Qb\.\.. · 
2 Councillor w. E. Olds 
3 City Council Minute Book No. I July - December 1964. 
P• 54164, Original underlined, 
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July 1964 the critical question was whether the Reserves 
Committee could maintain their determination and unity 
at the anticipated special meeting of the Council to 
discuss the amended Plan. 
This meeting finally took place on 30th November 
1964. 1 At this meeting the unity of the Reserve Committee 
was broken down by the precarious achievement of unity by 
the Citizens' majority in the Council. The Plan became 
0 Government policy 0 for the first time in the sense that 
the majority gr0up in the Council were committed to the 
project as a party. The issue at stake was now a precise 
one - Council approval for the Plan as distinct from 
the rather ambiguous request for approval in principle. 
As members of the 9 Government 0 most Citizens° Councillors 
were willing to assume the responsibility for securing 
this approval. The argument for approval was put in 
the Council by Councillor Guthrey, Chairman of the Works 
Committee ~nd it was put as 0 Government policy 0 • The 
days of a non-party formula, supplied by the City Engineer 
and acceptable to the Council as a whole, were gone. 
The conversion of the Master Transportation Plan 
debate into a party issue in the City Council raises the 
1 Mr, George Manning the Mayor was overseas when the 
meeting was arranged. Deputy-Mayor, R· P, Smith 
told the author that he was in no hurry to arrange 
for such a difficult and politically embarrassing 
occasion. 
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problem of giving an account of the formation of party 
policy. This is especially difficul~ in the case of 
the Citizens 9 Association because members insist it is 
not a party but an association of individuals. Political 
party practices are resisted or if practised, go unrec-
ognised or unacknowledged. There is in fact no agree-
ment among Citlzens° Councillors on the precise nature 
of their group, C~eyne reports that two-fifths of 
Citizens° Councillors claimed that 11 there were no issues 
at all on which the group was expected to act as a 
body. 911 On the other hand Councillor Guthrey, an 
influential member of the Association, has asserted that 
the Citizens 9 Association must respond to the challenge 
of Labou~ Party unity with somo measure of cohesion of 
't 2 i s own. This conflict between the virtues of 
independence - on which Citizens° Councillors lay great 
stress - and the need for unity in order to transact 
Council business shows no sign of being resolved, 
It might be said that the Citizens 0 Association is 
an immature, or alternatively, a reluctant party, The 
operation of the Citizens 0 caucus prior to the two 
critical Council debates on the Plan on JOth November 
1 G, Cheyne °Christchurch - Th~Men Who Gove.rn. 9 p.89 
2 0Press 0 8th October 1965. 
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and 16th December 1964 ofter good illustrations of the 
confusion and uncertainty which is the product of such 
a situation, Both parties hold a caucus in the hour 
preceding Council meetings. The Labour Party is quite 
frank about this but Ci.tizens ° Councillors prefer to 
8.rgue that their meeting is no caucus at all, Indeed 
there is some reason to accept this view. Councillor 
H. P. Smith who chairs the Citizens 0 caucus does not 
refer to it as such precisely because of the association 
of the term with disciplined party politics. The 
Citizens' caucus, like the Citizens 0 Association itself, 
has no clearly defined role, Its prime function, 
according to Councillor Smith, is to brief Councillors 
on the recommendations of Council committees of which 
they are not members. Much of the typica1 business of a 
party caucus - the process of debate and bargaining in 
search of a basis for agreement = is carried on outside 
caucus. According to former Citizens° Councillor 
T, D. Flint the practice of "ringing around 19 is at least 
as important as the bargaining processes of caucus itself. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of a meeting which some 
Councillors seldom attend, or attend late, must be 
limited, An additional handicap on the effectiveness of 
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caucus is the time allowed which at forty minutes must 
often be ihadequate. 
Yet despite all these factors limiting the effect-
iveness of caucus there is a tendency for majority opinion 
to exert an effective pressure for unity. Councillor 
Smith calls this pressure "voluntary discipline". 
Former Councillor T. D. Flint testified to this pressure 
to achieve unanimity and discipline when he stood as an 
independent in the 1965 Local Body Elections, giving as 
his reason, his "inability to speak and act independently 
at the Council table, 111 Tho\.l'gh there is some confusion 
as to the precise authority of caucus there is a clear 
minimum assumption on which the Citizens 0 caucus 
operates. If a minority cannot be reconciled with the 
majority then those who intend to express their dis-
agreement in open Council must make their intention 
known to the caucus. 
It was in this ambiguous, and only slightly developed 
institution that Citizensq Councillors met to attempt to 
prepare a common front for the special meeting of the 
Council on JOth November. Councillors Smith and. Guthrey 
brought to caucus a formula for which they hoped to secure 
1 
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general agreement. This draft resolution approved the 
Plan with the exception of the Park motorway which was to 
be reserved for City Council design. But it was the 
way in which this proposal was put which was vital, 
Not only was the route and design of the motorway 
through the Park reserved for City Council decision but 
this was represented by Councillor Guthrey as merely a 
matter of deciding whether Harper Avenue - which he 
emphasised already ran through the Park - would remain 
on its present course or whether it should be re-aligned 
for shorter access to Park Terrace. This reduction of 
the Park route issue to such innocuous terms completely 
undercut the objections of the Reserves Committee report 
of 20th July. Not surprisingly Councillor Skellerup 
was not completely satisfied with this verbal manoeuvre 
of which he was the principal victim. 1 Both he and 
Councillors Olds and McLean, his fellow Reeerves Committee 
members, went into the Council Chamber having most 
reluctantly agreed to support the motion, However. one 
Councillor declared his intention of voting against the 
motion for another reason, Councillor R, G. Brown told 
both the caucus and the Council that he could not vote 
---------------------~--~~---=---~-· 
1 Councillor Skellerup told the author that this 
caucus was an 11unhappy 11 meeting, 
1J4 
for approval of the Plan because of his disapproval of 
the displacement of an estimated 400 residents on the 
Northern motorway route. 1 • 2 
The formation of Labour Party policy is, in theory 
at least, more easily set out, Policy is determined by 
the Christchurch Labour Representation Committee but this 
formal constitutional statement is to some extent mis-
leadj_ng, In the firstp_lace the L.R.C. is anxious to 
avoid creating the impression that it dominates local 
body members. Secondly, it is argued by some Labour 
Councillors that they are elected to represent the City 
not the :L.R,C. Some Councillors, absorbed by local body 
affairs, seldom attend the L.R.c.J In addition the 
L.R.C. does not have sufficient time to devote to local 
body affairs even if it ~id have ambitions of determining 
policy. One two-hour meeting a month, much of it 
devoted to routine business and a wide range of concerns 
besides City Council affairs simply does not permit a very 
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Former Councillor Brown told the author that he 
opposed the Plan because he thought that such destruc-
tion wrong, Mr. Brown lives in the North Road in 
the area through which the motorway will pass and he 
knew that people in the area were disturbed at the 
prospect. He believes that much of his vote came 
from his home area, Councillor Brown lost his seat 
at the October 1965 Local Body Ele~tions. 
Councillor Denton, when the author interviewed him 
in January 1967, had not been for nearly two years. 
affairs are dealt with piecemeal by the L.R.C. and a 
plan for regular reports by Labour Councillors to the 
L.R.C, has yet to be implemented. 1 
Since publication of the Plan discussion at the 
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L.R.C. and by the L.R.C, Executive has been frequent but 
unsystemmatic. On only one occasion was a meeting 
arranged by the L.R.C. or its Executive for the purpose 
of discussin*~the Plan alone. On 25th February 1966 
Labour Councillors met members of the L.R. C, Et·ecuti ve 
(only four of whom were present) to determine policy on 
the Plan in the light of Professor Buchanan's report on 
it, For the rest :the Plan was discussed at the L.R.C. 
as the opportunity offered. On these occasions 
discussion of the Plan was usually brief and inconclusive. 
On two occasions (both late 1964) Councillor Denton, as a 
City Council representative on the Regional Planning 
Authority, addressed the L.R,C, on the subject of the 
Plan, Each time he was squeezed in at the end of the 
evening. 
Despite the practical independence of Councillors as 
a group there has never been any serious division between 
the L,R,C, on the one hand and the Councillors on the 
1 In mid-1967 there is a possibility that fairly 
regular, probably bi-m:onthly, consultation will 
be implemented, 
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other. ihat divisions of opinion there have been have 
cut across the Labour movement in Christchurch as a whole, 
According to Councillor N. G. Pickering there have been, 
broadly speaking, three Labour Party opinions on the 
Plan. ~significant minority never wanted to oppose 
the Plan. Mayor George Manning was one of these and 
had to be instructed by the L.R.C,, both before and after 
Professor Buchanan°s visit, that he must support the 
Labour Party 0 s opposition to any infringement of Hagley 
Park, A second group or opinion focussed its attention 
on the road thrcugh the Park, while a third group in which 
Councillor Pickering places himself, though concentrat-
ing on the Park route for political impact, had broader 
objections to the Plan. Like the Study Group they had 
misgivings about the effect of motorways on the City 
centre. However, an emphasis on opposition to the Park 
route obscured these differences. Councillor 
H. E. Denton does not fall into any of these groups but 
his opposition too, was made ambiguous by his own and his 
Party 0 s emphasis on the Park route, For a long period 
a City Council representative on the Regional Planning 
Authority, he became convinced of the validity of the 
concept of the Plan. In July 196L~ he told a meeting of 
137 
the Christchurch Transport Board of which he was a member, 
that the City would be 11 a shambles of the worst kind 11 if 
1 the Plan were not implemented. Yet by strenuously 
opposing any intrusion on the Park he actually helped to 
delay the project, 
It is only in the light of these party processes 
that the City Council debate on 30th November 1964, can 
be understood. The political dangers, or alternatively 
the rewards, of this occasion were emphasised by the 
presentation of a petition signed by 10,376 persons 
asking the Council not to approve the Park route. The 
petition requested that if approval were contemplated the 
Council should put the issue to the test of a poll. 
This petition was organised by Mr. E. R. DPAnvers whose 
Hagley Park Protection League had been formed in July and 
had subsequently advertised for support in the newspapers. 
Mr. D0Anvers told the author that the League spent 
between £200 - £300 on advertising, stationery and other 
expenses, Mr. D9Anvers was in touch with principal 
opponents of the Plan, notably Mr. H. G. Royds and 
Councillor P. J. Skellerup. 
petition to the Counc11. 2 
The latter presented the 
1 
2 
0Press 9 21st July 1964. 
Mr. D0Anvers who is a retired accountant was 
Social Credit candidate for Gisborne in 1954. 
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Councillor Guthrey opened the meeting by putting the 
resolution for which he had sought prior agreement in 
caucus. This proposal to approve the Plan while 
reserving the Park route for Council treatment was 
seconded by Councillor Hay (Citizens') who expressed the 
hope that the proposal would prove acceptable to the 
Council as a whole as a reasonable compromise. 
In the course of his ten minute address Councillor 
Guthrey mentioned the possibility of calling on outside 
advice but he did not make it clear on precisely what an 
outside opinion might be needed. Councillor Hay who 
followed this suggestion up mentioned the name of the 
former City Engineer of Melbourne who had visited 
Christchurch in July. 1 In the debate which followed 
Councillor Skellerup moved an amendment that the Council 
should immediately resolve to engage "a recognised 
overseas expert before reaching a decision on the future 
of road transportation in the City. 112 Labour 
Councillors failed to exploit this opportunity and 
allowed Councillor Guthrey time to speak to Councillor 
Skellerup and persuaded him to withdraw his amendment• 
assuring him that if necessary expert advice would be 
1 
2 
Mr. L. T. Fraser 0 s comments on the Plan were 
reported by the 0Press 0 on 10th July.\qb~. 
City Council Minute Book No. 1 July - December 1964. 
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sought. 
This confusion indicates the inadwquacy of preparation 
for the debate in the Citi~envs eaucus. Councillor 
Skellerup almost certainly brought the idea up in the 
caucus but Councillor Guthrey's subsequent ambiguous 
acknowl~ementof it was unsatisfactory to him. The 
complexity of Councillor Skellerup 0 s own position and 
therefore the uncertainty of the purpose for which ~e 
required an overseas expert contributed to the confusion. 
Not only was he identified as the foremost opponent of 
the Park route b~t he also had doubts about the principle 
of the Plan, In a letter to the 0~' on 6th June 1964 
he argued against the approach of motorways near city 
centres. He claimed that motorways were intended only 
to carry high speed traffic between large centres of 
population, 
The Labour Party rejected Councillor Guthrey's 
motion outright and in its stead Councillor R,M, Macfarlane 
proposed that the Council should send the Plan back to 
the Regional Planning Authority. In addition the 
Labour Party offered a specially prepared version of the 
Study Group 0 s 'plan° which the Authority was invited to 
consider again, Councillor Pickering had on his own 
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initiative contacted the Study Group and a plan was 
prepared for this meeting of the Council to enable the 
Labour Party to complete :its opposition role by offering 
an al terna ti ve, In addition, the Group 0 s plan was 
argued for before the Council by Mr. B. McClelland on 
behalf of the Study Group. Similarly, Mr. Bradshaw was 
allowed ten minutes to defend the Authority 0 s Plan. 
Mr. McClelland put the case for the use of the Belts as 
a six lane ring road, This alternative he recommended 
as more up-to-date and less expensive than the Master 
Transportation P1an, It was also claimed to reconcile 
the two requirements which the Plan could not - greatly 
increased traffic flow with the full use of city centre 
amenities unhampered by traffic. Councillor M.B. Howard 
told the Council that ~hey (~he Study Group) have got the 
ideas that the ordinary common people want. They are 
not fancy planners, they are just ordinary common 
people, 111 
This unlikely alliance of the Labour Party with a 
group of professional people most of whom were hostile or 
indifferent to the iltbour movement lent a slightly bizarre 
note to the meeting, The formal opposition of the rival 
1 City Council Minute Book No. I July - December 1964. 
p.54152, p.20 
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plans was itself unreal yet it represented the fulfillment 
of the Study Group 0 s claim to equal competence in the 
technical debate. And the impartial and equal treatment 
accorded Messrs. Bradshaw and McClellaDd by the Council 
also helped to maintain the fiction that the Council 
had a choice, 
In the event Councillor Guthreyvs motion was 
accepted by eleven votes to nine, Councillor Brown voting 
with the opposition. But the idea of engaging a consult-
ant to review the Plan had found another sponsor in 
Councillor P1cker1ng'who now belatedly sought to put an 
amendment to replace that withdrawn by Councillor 
Skellerup. However, he was refused permission to do so 
on procedural grounds by the Chairman, Mr. Manning, He 
immediately announced his intention of moving such a 
motion at the next meeting of the Council and subsequently, 
in a letter to the Town Clerk dated 7th December 1964, he 
gave notice of his intention of moving a motion asking 
that the resolution approving the Plan be revoked. 
Further vi, • • that the City Council should engage the 
services of a world renowned City Planning consultant to 
study the Master Transportation Plan in relation the the 
general planning of the City of Christchurch and suggest 
any modifications or alterations with a view to providing 
for the maximum possible needs of traffic and the welfare 
of the comm~rcial community while preserving and enhancing 
good environment." 1 The wording of this motion was the 
work of Mr. H. G. Royds to whom Councillor Pickering had 
turned for advice, It was in fact a very brief state-
ment of, the interests of the City Planning Study Group 
. 2 
and was written with a particular consultant in mind. 
Councillor Pickering 0s motion represented a new 
threat to the Plan because it offered the possibility of 
detaching Councillor Skellerup and at laast one or two 
other Citizens° Councillors from the Council majority, 
With a copy of Councillor Pickering 0 s motion before them 
at the caucus of 16th December, Councillors Guthrey and 
Smith sought a fresh compromise to deal with this threat. 
Councillor Guthrey 0 s amendment to Councillor Pickering 9 s 
motion conceded the consultant but it did not revoke the 
Council 9 s approval of the Plan, Instead it asked the 
Regional Planning Authority 11 to take careful note of 11 the 
consultant 0 s decision. For the rest Mr. Roydse wording 
was adopted without change, 
Councillor S"kellerup subsequently stated that he had 
1 .Copy of mot1c.n.1n private collection of documents. 
2 Professor C, D. Buchanan, 
14.3 
supported Councillor Guthrey 0 s amendment because the 
consultant must have a plan to consider. Councillor 
Pickering, on the other hand, argued that the consultant 
ou&it t:rot to have his hands tied and be restricted to 
criticisms of detail. 1 The vpress 0 too, considered that 
since approval for the Plan was retained the consultant vs 
advice would be required chiefly on matters of detail. 2 
Yet the Regional Planning Authority with some justification, 
considered that the approval given its Plan on JOth 
November was rescinded on 16th December,3 In fact the 
consultant could not avoid a judgement on the main 
proposals of the Plan. Indeed his terms of reference 
asked him to consider a 0non-motorwayv plan, the 
Study Group proposals. The consultant 0 s essentially 
political task was a twofold one. He was required by 
the final authors of his terms of reference to endorse 
the principle of the motorway system and secondly to 
settle the disputed question of the route of the 
Fendalton-Avonside motorway. The consultantPs great 
value to the Council was that he could perform both tasks 
with supreme technical authority, something which the 
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Professor Buchanan Decides the .. I~ 
The idea of employing a consultant to settle a 
technical issue for the City Council was not a new one. 
At the time the debate on the Plan opened the City Council 
resolved a similar controversy by accepting the advice 
of an overseas consultant, Almost exactly one month 
after the Plan was revealed in September 1962 a report' 
was delivered to the City Council by Professor 
w. G, Stephenson1 which finally settled a long-standing 
dispute on the question of a site for a Town Hall. In 
May 1961 the City Council had 8dopted this exped:i.ent as 
the only possible way of achieving a decision, At that 
time the dispute was deadlocked for want of an authorit-
ative opinion to make out a convincing case for one or 
other of two sites, 
This precedent was in fact mentioned from the 
beginning of the Master Transportation Plan dispute as a 
method of settling the issue. In their first press 
statement, Messrs. Beaven and Royds and Dr. P. S. Cook 
referred to the success of Professor Stephenson 9 s visit 
and implied that the expedient might well be repeated in 
the case of the Master Transportation Plan. 2 Opponents 
1, 
2. 
Professor Stephenson held the Chair of Town 
Planning at the University of Western Australia, 
0Press 9 9th November 1962. 
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of the Plan also took comfort from the fact that Prof. 
Stephenson had decided against the Regional Planning 
Authority 9 s first choice for a Town Hall site. 1 In 
mid-1964 when both part1e,s to the dispute scoured the 
Buchanan Report for material to support their cases, 
City Councillor R. G. Stillwell (Labour) suggested in a 
letter to the 0Press 0 that Professor Buchanan should be 
engaged by the Council. 2 
When Counctllor Skellerup moved his amendment for 
an overseas consultant, at the JOth November meeting of 
the Council, he had Professor Buchanan in mind, He had 
been in touch with S~1dy Group members for some time and 
reflected their preference for Professor Buchanan, That 
portion of Councillor Pickeringvs motion drafted by 
Mr. Royds which was incorporated in Councillor Guthrey 0 s 
amendment, was intended as an invitation to Professor 
Buchanan to apply his method (as set out in 9Traffic in 
Towns) to the Master Transportation Plan, The City 
Planning Study Group greatly preferred Professor Buchanan 
though failing him they mentioned as possibilities 
Professor Stephenson and Professor Ling of Coventry. It 
is hardly surprising then that when, during the 
1 This was pointed out by a correspondent in the 
0Press 9 , 28th February 1963. 
2 • vpress 9 , 18th July 1964 · 
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Christmas - New Year recess 1964-65, the City Council 
Town Planning Committee assumed the responsibility of 
finding a consultant acceptable to the Council, that 
Professor Buchanan was their first choice with Professors 
Stephenson and Ling as reserves. On 11th February 1965 
the ~Press 0 reported that Professor Buchanan had been 
approached and had indicated his willingness to accept 
the sssignment and that the City Council had, therefore, 
decided to invite him. 
Initially, however, Professor Buchanan was uncertain 
as to precisely what he was required to give his advice 
on. In the first place his terms of reference, which 
virtually invited the application of the principles of 
9Traffic in Towns 0 to the Christchurch situation,, were 
rather ambiguous considering that approval for the Plan 
was retained, This wording was of course originally 
coupled with the setting aside of the Plan. In Councillor 
PickeringQs motion it was intended that the consultant 
take a fresh look at the problem of traffic in 
Christchurch. Even if this ambiguity is ignored, the 
key instruction to the consultant 11 to study the Master 
TransportationPlan in relation to the general planning of 
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the Ci ty 11 w~rn very wide. Consequently, Professor 
Buchanan had to be informed of the precise nature of the 
political problems of the Council by letter, and mo~e 
fully when he arrived. 
Not only had the Council to make it clear what it 
required of its consultant but it had also to prep8re 
to make effective use of his advice. Professor Buchanan 
was the expert beyond whom there was no appeal and the 
City Council was eager to commit itself in advance to 
accepting his sdvice, For Councillor Skellerup in 
particul2r, Professor Bu0hanan represented the means of 
salvation from a very difficult position and when his 
acceptance was announced Councillor Skellerup promptly 
stated that he would accept Professor Buchanan°s decision 
and that he hoped other Councillors would do the same. 1 
The Council as a whole was eager to reinforce Professor 
Buchanan°s authority by virtually abdicating its own in his 
his favour. His great professional authority was 
emphasised by his sponsors to justify their commitment -co 
accepting his decision. When he announced Professor 
Buchanan°s acceptance, Councillor G. D. Griffiths, 
Chairman of the Town Planning Committee, said. that he was 
1 'Press 0 • 11th February 1965, 
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"the leading consultant of the British Commonwealth in 
the subj ect 11 • 1 The parallel with the Town Hall case is 
very close. When the engagement of a consultant was 
announced the Town Hall Committee issued a statement 
saying that "the Council, as the elected government of 
the City, should make a strong appeal to all citizens to 
put from their minds all their previously held opinions 
and accept and act upon the advice of a man whose know-
ledge and experience could provide for Christchurch a 
plan which would command the admiration of those who 
followed". 2 
Professor Buchanan and his partner were at first 
expected at the end of September 1965 but their arrival 
was postponed to the New Year, While they were awaited 
debate was virtually suspended and the Plan was not a 
significant issue at the 1965 Local Body Elections.3 
Nevertheless on the eve of the poll the 0Press 0 found it 
necessary to chide 11 spme short-sighted ca.ndida tesi1 for 
attempting to exploit opposition to encroachment on the 
4 Park. Councillor Pickering sought a means to tap this 
opposition when he canvassed the idea in Labour Party 





'Press'~ 11th February 1965. 
9Press 0 , 18th M.ay 1961. 
It was suggested to the author that the Citizens 0 
Councillors handling the negotiations encouraged 
Professor Buchanan to delay till after the Elections, 
0Press 0 6 8th October 1965 · 
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public opinion on the question, However, he gained 
little support and the suggestion lapsed, 
In their manifesto the Labour Party merely promised 
a review "of the Master Transportation Plan with 
particular reference to its effects on Hagley Park and 
the interest of residents who would be affected by the 
Plan. •1 The Citizens' Association manifesto promised 
that Citizens° Councillors would accept Professor 
Buchansm 0 s advice while at the same time it recorded 
their 11 determina ti on to preserve our treasured heritage 
of Hagley Park where road. widening or deviation must be 
kept m an absolute minimum. 11 Councillor H. P, Smith, in 
a prepared statement, boldly acknowledged that traffic 
engineering in the next ten to fifteen years would become 
an increasing burden on Council income. 1 
Professor Buchanan arrived in Christchurch at the 
beginning of January 1966 to find himself at the C"entre 
of a complex and demanding political situation. On the 
one hand, as the City Council 9 s consultant, he was obliged 
to do his best to find solutions to the political diffi-
culties of his sponsor, On the other, he was reminded of 
his strictly professional obligation by the Study Group who 
1 
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had high hopes that he would critically apply his 
theoretical schemes to the Plan. His role as arbiter 
of the City 0 s fate is highlighted by the request of a group 
making representations to him, that they be granted a 
private and confidential hearing. The reason given for 
this request was that the group wished to have the same 
opportunity as all other interested parties to put its 
case. 1 
Professor Buchanan discussed the Plan with 
Mr. C. B. Millar and Mr. Malcolm Douglass of the Region~l 
Plannin'.< Authority and. it seems likely that the Authority 
supplied him with more documentary and statistical 
information than he and his partner had time to consider. 
However, the only member of the team which produced the 
Plan, seen by Professor Buchanan, was Miss Northcroft 
with whom tte discussed the issues on the evening before 
he reported to the Council and when his 0 Review 0 was 
largely written. He did, of course, see m8mbers of the 
Study Group whose alternative proposals he was required 
to consider. 
When he took his findings to the City Council on 
14th January, Professor Buchanan said that his had been a 
1 Mr. Scoular the City Engineer reports this incident 
in his Comment on Professor Buchanan°s 0 Planning in 
Christchurch1 A Review° Colin Buchanan and 
Partners London January 1966. City Council 
Minutes 1966, p.55260 
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91 difficul t and to some extent invidious task" • 1 He was 
referring to the great authority the City Council had 
sought to invest him with, an authority which? he said, 
he had was reluctant to accept, He had no wish, he said, 
2 to be 91 put on a pedesta1v1 , Rather than hand down a 
decision as he had been encouraged to do, he preferred to 
state the facts and let the Council decide, Yet the 
circumstances of the case and the nature of the problems 
at issue did not permit this, As the Council had intended, 
the specific pro~lems on which it required decisions were 
11 settled on technical traffic grounds". 3 
However, in his 0 Review 0 of the Plan, the consultant 
dealt with these problems on which the Council required a 
decision only after a broader discussion of the Plan. 
His method was to set out in general terms the City 0 s 
anticipated transportation problem and then to give an 
account of the principles which he believed must guide and 
discipline any solution, In other words he merely applied 
the principles which were set out in Chapter II of 9Traffic 
in Towns 0 to Christchurch. This of course was what his 
0 gltostQ sponsors, the Study Group, required him to do, 




From his address to the City Council on 14th 





"delighted" Messrs. Beaven, Royds and Montgomery. 
Professor Buchanan's basic criticism of the Plan 
was that it proposed a road networl{ for Chri.stchurch in 
1980 without having a sufficiently clear picture of 
what form the City will have taken by that time. Such 
a plan for traffic movement over the long term, he 
argued, cannot have any reliable predictive power if ;it 
is not prepared as an integral part of a town plan. 
Professor Buchanan found inadequate - though he did not 
say so quite so bluntly - material collected towards a 
town plan, In fact he could locate no "Regional 
Planning Scheme", only some elements of such a scheme -
local body zoning proposals, an urban fence map, a plan 
for manufacturing and the Master Transportation Plan 
itself. 1 
One of the results of the development of a compre-
hensive town plan would be the delineation of environ-
mental areas, Since he could find no such plan he made 
it clear that he believed that the relationship of the 
primary road system of the Master Transportation Plan 
with the areas they served must be a highly suspect one. 
1 When he wrote his 0Review 0 Professor Buchanan's 
knowledge of background work dons by the Regional 
Planning Authority was incomplete, He was 
apparently not aware of the existence of confidential 
land use studies done by the Authmri ty. Neither 
was he fully informed on more recent environmental 
area studies don8 by both the City Council and the 
Auth0rity, This latter point was made by 
Mr, Secular in his Comment on the VReview 0 • City 
Council Ni:-jutes 1966, p.55260, p.2 
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The primary road system in Professor BuchananQs phrase 
must be 1'bent on" to the environmental areas and the 
capacity of the network must be appropriate to the 
capacity of the environmantal areas, Neither of these 
objectives could be achieved, except by good fortune, 
when the method of the Plan in establishing a road 
network was not to first establish the environmental 
areas but was merely 91 to compare future forecasted 
traffic volumes with existing strPet capacities and 
then where ser:'...ous overloading occurs to consider ways 
and. means of increasing street capacity either by 
widening or insPrting a new road. 111 The consultant 0 s 
conclusion was that u the method by which these motorways 
have been arrived. at, however, is a far cry from the 
systemmatic study of network and environmental area 
questions over tho whole of the urban area which we 
would wish to have seen undertaken. 112 
The 0 Re vi.§!!' distinguishes two 11 vitally 
central environmental areas (the central shopping area 
and the ~sland 0 between Hagley Park and the Avon River) 
which, it points out, the Master Transportation Plan 
does not clearly define. The 'Review 9 offers an 
1 9 Review 0 p. 34 
2 
Ibid p. 35 
3 ''Ibid ... 
alternative sketch plan showing how these two areas 
could be serviced, correcting a tendency found in the 
Plan v1to desire to use the maximu:tJJ. possible amount of 
road space for traffic purposes irrespective of environ-
mental considerations.~ 1 It is als.o argued in the 
9 Review 9 that the proposed bridge linking Antigua Street 
and Rolleston Avenue should be deleted from the Plan 
because it would introduce extraneous traffic into that 
environmental area, This revision is an application of 
Professor Buchanan's principle that all the main 
approaches to the centra~ area should be from the East. 
It might be thought that this severe criticism of 
the method of the Flan would have finally discredited 
it. TMS- was not the case for though Professor 
Buchanan was critical of the method of the Plan he 
approved its main proposals. In general he found 
"the transportation study to be reliable as far as the 
case for the central motorways is concerned." 2 
Elsewhere in the ~Review 9 he revealed how it was possible 
to at once criticise the method of the Plan and yet approve 
its pr~osals when he said that i 1the possibilities for 
network location in the vj_cini ty of the eerrtmlL area 
1 0 Review 9 p.44 
2 :n:li:b1d p.54 
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are necessarily limited. It may well be that even the 
full network study we have advocated would produce 
proposals not vnstly dissimilar to those which have 
been evolved in the shape of the motorway proposals of 
the Transportation Plan. 111 
Not only did he approve the motorway system but he 
also endorsed the need for, and siting of, the 
Fendalton-Avonside motorway though he noted that 
"the 1980 traffic figures are only just sufficient to 
justify a road of motorway standards, 02 Having 
conceded the need, he detailed but rejected a scheme 
to use Bealey Avenue instead, He found the official 
solution 11 better and 9 cleaner 9 than the somewhat 
0 squeezed in° proposition for Bealey Avenue. 11 .3 
This conclusion was for the purposes of political 
decision the most important finding of the 'Review'. 
Professor Buchanan's approval for the motorway system, 
and for the Fendalton-Avonside motorway in particular, 
provided his formal sponsors - the City Council 
Citizens 0 majority - with the authoritative opinion 
they required, This rather negative approval settled 
the 0 low 0 argument about the Plan for it was the basis 
1 Ibid p.36 
2 !,bid p.40 
J Ibid p.42 
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on which the majority group in the Council was finally 
able to act as a united party. At the SR.me time the 
'Review', as an authoritative critique of the method 
and implications of the Plan, was the culmination of the 
0high 0 argument about the Plan, It was Professor 
Buchanan ° s masterly ach:ie vement to satisfy both his 
formal and. his informal sponsors. 
The 0.§.1§1:: 1 reported a 99 storm of reaction11 to news 
of Professor Buchanan's approval of the route of the 
Fendalton-Avonside motorway. 1 Councillor Skellerup 
was reported as pEef erriLg that all the trees in Bealey 
Avenue should be sacrificed than that the Park should be 
violated. At the same time he was prepared to honour 
his pledge to follow Professor Buchanan~s advice in 
which case the intrusion should be as slight as possible. 
Mr. E. R, D0Anvers, organiser of the 'major 1964 petition, 
offered to organise another with a target of 100,000 
signatures. 2 
This narrow reaction to the 'Review', a reissue of 
the protest which greeted the Plan in September 1962, 
was confirmed at a meeting of the City Council on 




entirely to the subject of the Fendalton-Avonside 
motorway. Citizens' Councillors stressed that the 
route had been e..pproved by a consultant whose opinion 
could not be surpassed • For the Labour side, Councillor 
. Pickering called for the further investigation of the 
Bealey Avenue alternative narrowly rejected by Professor 
Buchqnan, On a clearcut party division the meeting 
adopted the City Development Committee~s recommendation 
that the Plan be approved subject to "the Harper Avenue 
link to the Carlton Mill Bridge being deleted and the 
Antigua Street bridge proposal being omitted until the 
Council had determined a central city network based orr 
an Pnvironmental area study.n 1 • 2 • 
Professor Buchanan°s 0Review 0 was not discussed. 
Councillor Guthrey merely stated, when introducing his 
Committee 0 s recommendation, that 11 we are prepared to 
support the Professor 0 s report entirely, 11 3 Final 
approval for the Plan, following a debate with no more 
than a passing reference to Professor Buchanan's 
concern for the securing of arrangements to make the 




0 Press~ 22nd March 1966. 
Subsequently at a mPeting of the Regional Planning 
Authority Councillor W.P. Glue contested (perhaps 
ironically) Mr. Bradshaw 0 s assumption of City 
Council approval for the Plan. He pointed out 
that the Council had yet to discuss the Northern 
and Southern motorways. 'Press' 4th May 1966. 
'Press 0 22nd March 1966. 
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City, was the ultimate distortion of the Master 
Transportation Plan dispute. This opportunity 
to debate the crucial issues which the Plan implied for 
the City was declined. The Council had merely 
approved a roading Plan, the serious implications of 
which it seemed hardly aware. 
CHAPTER VIII 
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1he Question of Public Op~nion 
The debate about the Master Transportation Plan was 
conditioned by assumptions about the affect of proposals 
on public opinion, yet at no time did anybody concerned 
have any idea of the real dimensions of public opinion. 
This study would not be complete without some attempt to 
answer this question. 
Early in April 1966 a postal questionnaire was sent 
to a random sample of 350 people whose names were taken at 
regular intervals from the Christchurch City District 
Electors 0 Roll (1965). A final return of 297 (or 85%) 
was achieved by calling on a sample of the 60 odd who had 
failed to reply, In most of these cases the questionnaire 
had not reached the person to whom it was addressed. 
The questionnaire contained ten questions plus a 
final section to establish the age, length of residence 
and education of the sample. It should be noted at the 
outset that the 21-29 age group was under-represented in 
the sample. 
21 - 29 
9% (JO) 




40 - 49 
27% (79) 
50 - 64 
28% (82) 
65+ Total 
18% (53) 100%(297) 
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Questionned on their attitude to the Plan as a whole, 
over half (55%) said that they were "moderately interested", 
while JO.% said that they were 11 very interested 11 • Of the 
remainder, 11% were "slightly interested 11 and J% "not at 
all 11 • Responses to this question were compared with 
responses to a question which asked how often they had 
followed newspaper reports on the Plan. As might be 
expected, there was a high correlation between 11 very 
interestedcv and regular reading of newspaper reports, 
Table f. 
Reading of newspaper reports on the Plan 
compared with degree of interest 
Interest: .Ee12orts read~ 
Not at all OccasionallJ:: Rep;ular:J:;y_ 
Not at all JJ% ( 4) J% ( 5) 
Slightly 25% ( J) 19% (J2)) 
Moderately L~2% ( 5) 67% (114) 37% ( 42) 
Very 11% ( 18) 63% ( 70) 
Total 100% (12) 100% (169( 100,% (112) 
A comparison of interest with age reveals a marked 
difference between the youngest (21 - 29) and the oldest 
.+he 
(65 and over). Whereas 80% of~21 - 29 group were only 
11 r::tod.erately interested", only JJ% of the 65 and over group 
were only "moderately interested 11 while nearly half (48%) 
of this group were '1very interested, 11 
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Degree of Interest compared with Age 
Interest: 21 - 29 30 - 22 4Q_.::..,.49 )O - 64 £2 and over 
Not at all 2%( 1) 5%( 4) 2%(' 2) 5%( 3) 
Slightly 13%( 4) 11% ( 6) 13%(10) 7%( 6) 14%( 8) 
Moderately 80%(24) 62%(32) 56%(43) 59%(48) 33%(19) 
Very 7% ( 2) 25%(13) 26%(20) 32%(26) 48%(27) 
Total 100%(30) 100%( 52) 100%(?7) 100%(82) 100%(57) 
Those with the longest formal education were only 
slightly more interested than those who left school at or 
before the age of 14. 
Table 4 
Degree of Interest compared with Education 













to 14 12 
( 5) 1% ( 1) 
( 6) 15% (11) 
(44) 51% (38) 
(22) 33% (24) 
(77) 100% (74) 
16 
1% ( 1 ) 
13% ( 9) 
60% (44) 
26% ( 19) 
100% (73) 
17 and over 
1% ( 1) 




To elicit the sample 9 s attitude to planning, a series 
of alternatives were offered in the questionnaire. 66% 
favoured the statement: 91 We should plan now to meet the 
traffic needs of the 1980°s; 91 while 17% thought that 
11 We shouldn ° t rush into anything but should mal{8 changes 
graciually 11 • A further 11% chose the statementu "we 
should let the problems develop to be sure what they are 
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before we try to tackle them 11 and 6% did not nominate a 
preference. A C-omparison of these preferences with 
formal education revealed a greater preference for the 
statement: vvwe should plan now to meet the traffic needs 
of the 1980 ° s 1~ among the two groups longest at school. 
Table .2 
Comparison of attitude to planning, with education. 
We should plan now 
to meet the traffic 
up to 14 at 12 at 16 
n~eds of the 1980°s 63%(42) 69%(49) 81%(57) 
We shouldn°t rush 
into anything but 
should make changes 
gradually 1B%(i2) 20,%(14) 10%( 7) 
17 or later 
76,%(53) 
16%(11) 
We should let the 
problems develop to 
be sure what they are 
before we try to 
tackle them 19%(13) 11%( 8) 9%( 6) 8%( 6) 
Total 100%(67) 100%(71)100%(70) 100%(70) 
In correspondence on the Plan in the two newspapers 
in 1962-63, and again in the second half of 1964, there 
were frequent derogatory references to the 0planners 9 
who were often characterised as a sub-species of the 
0faceless bureaucrat 0 stereotype. The most virulent 
expression of this opinion appeared in the correspondence 
columns of the 0 Star 0 on 7th MB.y 196Lp. This correspond-
ent wrote 1 91 Whenever I hear the word planner, I know 
that democracy is in danger. These planners are little 
men and can never, absolutely never, be relied upon to 
produce .the right answer and yet their name is legion. 
They proliferate like lice. (They are) oo• the Twentieth 
Century insecto" The most common accusation made against 
the apla.nners 9 was that they were narrow specialists. 
A correspondent in the aPress· on 22nd February 1963 
charged that 11 hurnani tarian, cultural and aesthetic 19 
values had been ignored in the preparation of the Plan. 
A similar point was made by a correspondent who said: 
11 Transporta ti on planners are not primarily concerned with 
values other than traffic ones. 101 Related to the charges 
of insensitivity and narrow professionalism was the 
suggestion that it was because some of these specialists 
were 10 not born and bred in Christchurch 112 that plans for 
the intrusion on Hagley Park were produced. Any native 
specialist, it was implied, would have known better. 
Apart from these recurring themes the planning officers 
were accused, among other things, of being untrustworthy,3 
and of 99 being where the overseas planners were JO years ago.,/+ 
1 aPressa 18th July 1964. 
2 LettEr in the 0 Ste,r 0 9th July 1964. 
3 astar 9 31st October 1964. 
4 V~9 30th November 1964. 
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On the question of the discretion to be 8.llowed 
experts such as town plann8rs and traffic engineers, 
another series of alternatives were offered in the 
"ltlUestionnaire, Only 29.% thought that 99 we should trust 
the experts who are train<:;d to know what is necessary. 11 
Nearly half ( 45.%) thought that the~r might be trusted 11 in 
general but checked when they go too fari9 , while 25.% 
thought that 99 the wishes of the public should be followed. 11 
A comparison of education with attitudes to this question 
revealed a significant difference, Whereas 31% of those 
who left school up to 14 thought that 11 the wishes of the 
public should be f ollowed11 only 12% of those who left 
school at 17 or later did so. 
Table 6 
Comparison of atti tucl.e to discretion 
to be allowed expertst with educatione 
Age left School 
up to 14 at 12 at 16 17 or later 
We should trust the 
experts who are trained 
to know what is 
necessary 25%(19) 31.%(21) 39,%(28) 29%(19) 
We should trust the 
experts in general but 
check them when they 
go too far 
The wishes of the public 
41%(31) 38,%(26) 42.%(30) 59.%(39) 
should be followed 31%(23) 31%(21) 19.%(14) 12,%( 8) 
Don't know 3%( 2) 
Total 100%(75) 100,%(68) 100,%(72) 100,%(66) 
The questionnairB revenled a l8,rge measure of 
disapproval for the City Council 0 s decision to employ a 
9 super-planner 0 • Exactly 50% of the sample disagreed 
with the decision to bring Professor Buchanan out from 
England to comment on the Plnn. Only 36% agrE,ed, while 
11.% had no opinion, and 3% did. not know. Some respond-
ents 0wrote in° their grounds for disagreement. Eight 
insisted that New Zealand experts were adequate, or 
indeed preferable, since they were familiar with local 
conditions. Six protested that Professor Buchanan°s 
fee was an unnecessary expense, including one respondent 
who said that it was via complete waste of public money'° 
and that Professor Buchanan "wants throwing over board 
before arrivaln. A further three respondents said that 
Professor Bu.chanan's engagement was both inappropriate 
and unnecessarily expensive. 
On the question of Professor Bu.chanan 9 s engagement 
a striking difference between educational groups emerged. 
Whereas only 19% of those who left school at or before age 
14 agreed. with the decision to engage Professor Buchanan, 
64% of those who left school at 17 or later did agree. 
TE!:ble 7 
Attitude to Professor Buchanan°s engagement 






Age left School 
U}2to 14'"""-rt-12 
19% (14) 21% (16) 
65% (48) 62% (47) 
12% ( 9) 16% (12) 
4% ( 3) 1% ( 1) 




11% ( 8) 
4.% ( 3) 
100% (73) 
17 or later 
64% (45) 
28% (20) 
170 ( 1 ) 
1% ( 1) 
100.% ( 71) 
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Professor Buchanan°s engagement was disagreed with by 
only 33% of the 21 - 29 age group but 63% of the 65 and over 
group disagreed. This difference is explained in part by 
the fact that the younger group tend to be better 
educated. 
Table 8 
Attitude to Professor Buchanan°s engagement 
compared with age. 
21 ~ 22. JO - ~9 40 - 49 :iO ~ 64 
Agree 57%(17) 40%(21) 30%(23) 37%(31) 
Disagree 33%(10) 49%(26) 50%(38) 51%(42) 
No Opinion 10%( 3) 9%( 5) 157:;(11) 11%( 9) 
Don°t know 2%( 1) 5%( 4) 1%( 1) 







Respondents were asked if the Plan affected them in 
any way. As proportions af the total number of responses 
to the alternatives, 18% (72) said they were not affected at 
all while 3% (12) did not know. As many as 167 (43% of 
all responses) considered themselves affected as motorists 1 
31% (113) as rate payers and 7% (28) as property owners. 
Asked for their view on the Park motorway and presenmed 
with a series of alternatives, 45% (147) indicated that 
the Park would not be harmed while 20% (67) thought that the 
alternatives were 99 either impractical or too expensive so 
we must reluctantly accept it, 91 A further 17% (57) 
167 
thought that "We should continue to search for an altern-
ative09 and 16% (53) thought that 01 the Park should not be 
touched in any circumstancesl 91 
On the key question of approval for the c.mended Park 
route 45% (134) 1.1approved11 while a further 19% (56) 
11 approved reluctantly~', These two categories taken 
together make up 64% (190) of the entire sample. Only 
26% (78) "disapproved" and 6% (19) "disapproved mildly", 
which taken toge.th er total 32% ( 97) of the sample. The 
categories of 11 don v t know 11 and 09 have no opinion'' accounted 
for 2% (8) each. 
When ii interest 11 was compared with i'approval 19 and 
"disapproval" a significant difference was revealed. 
Whereas 33% of those who"approved" were Wvery interested", 
close to half (46~of those who "disapproved" were very 
interested. 
To.blo 9 
Attitude to the Park route compared with degree of interest •. 
Not at all Slig_htl;v Moderately Very 
Approve 40%( 2) 57%(17) 51%(84) 39%(33) 
Approve reluctantly 10%( J) 25%(40) 14%(12) 
Disapprove mildly 20%( 6) 6%(10) 1%( 1) 
Disapprove 
<[l 
60%( 3) 13%( 4) 18%(29) 46%(39) 
Total 100%( 5) 100%(.30) 100%(163) 100%(85) 
A comparison of attitude to the Park route with age 
revealed a cleRr distinction bstween the 65 and over 
group and 8.11 other groups. The difference was most 
marl·rnd between the youngest and oldest group for whereas 
10% of the 21 - 29 group ''disapproved" the Park route, 
42% of the 65 and over group °'disapproved 99 • 
Table 10 
Attitude to the Park route conirpared with age. 
21 - 29 ~ 40 ·- .49 50 - 64 .2.i-± ---
Approve 48%(14) 53%(27) 46%(33) 49%(39) 30%(15) 
Approve reluct-
35%(10) 12%( 6) antly 27%(19) 16%(13) 16%( 8) 
Di SA.p prove 
9%( 2) 2%( 1) 6%( 4) 5%( 4) m1ldly 12%( 6) 
Disapprove 10%( 3) 33%(17) 21%(15) 30%(24) 42%(21) 
Total 100%(29) ::)Q%(5:e) 100%(71) 100%(80) 100%(50) 
No Significant differences between the four ec 
ional groups in their attitudes to the Park route v 
revealed, 
Table 11 
Attitude to the Park rcuto compared with education, 
Age left Schoolr !I_p to 14 at Ll ~ 16 
Approve 41%(29) 49%(35) 61%(44) 
Approve reluctantly 19%(13) 16%(11) 11%( 8) 
Disapprove mildly 13% ( 9) 4%( 3) 7%( 5) 
Disapprove 27%(19) 31%(22) 21%(15) 
100%(70) Tctal 100,%(70) 100%(71) 100,%'(72) 
A comparison of length of residence in Christchurch 
with attitude to the Park route, not surprisingly reveale< 
the largest measure of disapproval among those who had 
spent their whole life in the City. 
Table 12 
Attitude to the Park route compared 
with length of residence in Christchurch. 
Whole Life Over 10 years less 
Approve 46% ( 60) 40% ( .44) 
Approve 
reluctantly 18.% ( 24) 26% ( 29) 
Disapprove 
8% ( 11) 8% ( mildly 9) 
Disapprove 28% ( 37) 27% ( 30) 
Total 100% (1.32) 100% (112) 
than 10 yp,ars 
65% ( 20) 
13% ( 4) 
6% ( 2) 
16% ( 5) 
100% ( .31) 
It was thought that those respondents with a car in 
the household would be less likely to disapprove the Park 
route. This proved to be the case but only margin 
Table 1} 
Attitude to the Park route compared 







20% ( 47) 
6% ( 1.3) 







Finally, the distribution of attitudes on the Park 
route were related to newspaper readership. It might 
hsve been expected that since the 0Press' maintained a 
favourable attitude to the Plan that vPress 9 readers 
might have approved the Park route more readily than 
0~9 readers. This proved not to be the case. 
Table 14 
Choice of newspapAr r.omp8.red 
with ati;itude to the P8rk route 
Press Star 
Approve 36%( 22) 48,%( 55) 
Approve reluctnntly 28,%( 17) 18,%( 21) 
Disapprove mildly 5%( 3) 8%( 9) 
Disapprove 31%( 19) 26%( 30) 








The short conclusion to be drawn from this study of 
the politics of urban planning is that the processes of 
planning automatically exclude the possibility of signi-
ficant political choice, The real choices are made by 
the planners on professional or technical grounds. The 
role of the local body member is not to decide for or 
against a plan but merely to endorse it, How'ever, this 
account of their respective functions cannot ·be admitted 
by either the planner or the politician. Both are 
committed to the pretence that the political body must 
choose between real alternatives. Yet though there may 
be no choice the planner must still convince both the 
public and. his political masters of the validity o 
plan so that they will freely endorse it. He wil 
concede that in theory his plan may be rejected th 
in practice he knows that it must be accepted. T 
formal concession is vitally important to the poli 
who cannot admit that the responsibility for polit 
choice has been effectivel;ir taken out of his hands 
this way the incompatibility between the planning _ 
and the doctrine of political choice is necessarily 
blurred, often to such an extent that the politician long 
continues to believe that he retains the ability to choosE 
When the ~aster Transportation Plan was prepared in 
outline form, it presented an immediate problem for its 
originators and a potential problem for the political 
body to which it would pass. First, there was the 
Regj_onal Planning Authority 0 s problem of presenting its 
Plan. Second., therf:i was the City Council 0 s potential 
problem of corning to grips with the unpalatable i'act 
that its freedom to choose was confined to matters of 
detail. On the success with which the Regional Planning 
~~ firs-1-
Authori ty solvedA.._problem largely depended the City 
Council 0 s reaction to its problem. 
In 1962 when the Plan had only just reached the 
outline stage the Authority committed it, at short l 
to the test of open public discussion. The Author: 
is hardly to be blamed for this apparent blund.er fo: 
was compelled to publish by the demands of the poli· 
system in which it operated, The Autho:rtty was fo: 
to publish because it could not plan in isolation f: 
the political community to which it was responsible 
In fact the Authority itself has two aspects - a pr~~~.,., 
ional planning and a political aspect. The 11rnr};: of the 
Authority 0 s professional officers is under the constant 
scrutiny of the representatives of the constituent 
Councils whose task it is to consider the political 
implications of that work. Yet there seems to be an 
,_ I _; 
unresolV:able conflict between the demand of the planner 
to pursue his work with the minimum of outside interfer-
ence and the demands of a democratic society for knowledge 
of that process. Town planning and allied. activities are 
professional - technical activities, each opEJrating 
within the terms of its own professional discipline. 
Their practitioners tend to demand to be allowed to tal·rn 
their enquiries unhindered through their various stages 
until definitive conclusions are reached. Only then, 
they argue, may their work be published. Since this 
demand is unlikely to be met the planner must seelr. 
means of minimising the unwelcome effects of the c< 
which accompanies the open development of h.is plan, 
can attempt, if he has the resources and skills ne< 
to °stage manage 0 tho whole process of public discu: 
by guiding the1 public towards choices of which he i 
This of course involves a sophisticated public inf 
ation campaign. 
The Regional Planning AuthlDJDity in 1962 did not seem 
to be aware of the conflict between its need to be left 
174 
alone to define its solution and the demand from outside 
for knowledge of that process. In mid=1962 the Auth:ority 
was preparing t~ reveal its Outline Plan not to the 
public but to local bodies in closed session. This 
intention was in fact founded on an untenable distinction 
between the public and their political representatives. 
Clearly, it was unreasonable to ask local body ~embers to 
take decisions in advance of any public knowledge of the 
issues. 
tactic. 
Yet at first glance it seems an intellisent 
The Authority intended to abstract the local 
bodies from their political environment and in this more 
flexible situation inave them consider the Outline Plan in 
two parts. Thre intention was to ask for the endore 0m0n~ 
of the form of the motorway system, but only after E 
aside politically sensitive aspects of that system. 
the subject of these specific difficulties, and the 
for a motorway from Fendalton Road to Park Terrace 
particular, the Authority was prepared to discuss 
al terna ti ves. 
But at the same time (late 1961 early 1962) thi 
Authority provoked the demand for publication of the 
Outline by approaching the other half of its political 
equation - the public - not with the solution but with 
l. '() 
the problem alone. By seeldng to convince the public of 
the problem in preparation for their eventual reception 
of the solution, the Authority actually precipitated a 
demand for immediate publication of the solution. When 
compelled to publish the Authority found itself faced with 
a situation for which it was completely unprepared and 
could not control. It could not maintain its distinction 
between principles, or main proposals, and the details of 
these proposals. The Outline Plan appeared to most of the 
interested public, to mRlze a firm proposal for a road 
across North Hagley Park. Because it was never able to 
correct this impression and put in its place the idea of 
the Gneed for a motorway in the vicinity u, the AuthQ ri ty 
saw its plan unnecessarily delayed by the Hagley Pal 
protest. 
It only remains to consider why the City Councj 
for so long to appreciate the significance of the pJ 
which produced the Outline Plan1 a process which hE 
effect of abolishing the Council us prerogative of s: 
ficant political choice. The origin of the Counci: 
ure can be traced to the earlier failure of the Regional 
Planning Auth!Drity to deal adequately with its problem of 
the presentation of the Outline Plan. Not only did the 
.L(O 
Outline Plan fail to distinguish clearly between concept 
and detail but it also neglected to give some account of 
how the motorway system had been evolved in such a way 
as to make it clear that this system represented the 
definitive solution to the problem. Consequently, at 
the same time as the Authority failed to demonstrate the 
nocossi ty of its concept it seemed to malrn a highly 
objectionable proposal. The combination of these two 
circumstances obscured the proper course of the City 
Council. It was not clear that the Plan could not be 
rejected and there seemed very good reason to reject it. 
Eventually, however, it became obvious to the majority party 
party in the Council - who could hardly escape the 
responsibility - that approval for the Pl.an could n 
withheld indefinitely. By making the distinction 
concept and detail Councillors Guthrey and Smith we 
able to unite the Citizens' Association (with one 
exception) on JOth November 1964 in support of the 
The Labour Party, on the other hand, sustained the 
pretEmce to the very end that the City Council coul< 
equally well choose not to endorse the Plan. Had the 
Labour Party been in a majority in the Council it is 
difficult to see how it could have maintained such a 
position. The Plan demanded, and must have got, the 
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